I was away this past week I barely had any internet access, the week however was filled with disgrace!

Israel, has shown a new facet to the world… This is how the German perceived it according to Spiegel OnLine (H/T: IMRA):

The center-left daily Suddeutsche Zeitung writes:

“The macabre Israeli-Lebanese deal, which saw living Lebanese prisoners being swapped for the bodies of Israeli soldiers, is a major success for the Shiite militia.. The prisoner exchange shows who really has the power in Lebanon and who can force archenemy Israel to make concessions: It is Hezbollah, it is Nasrallah. That elevates the radicals’ image in Lebanon, inthe Arab world and in the Muslim world.”

[…]The new and obvious reality is that Israel has in fact rewarded and strengthened Hizbullah. Some in Lebanon refuse to cheer for Samir Kuntar,, since they perceive him as nothing more than the ruthless murderer he truly is. There is nothing heroic about killing an unarmed father and bludgeoning his 4 year old daughter to death with a rifle butt, after she witnessed her father savagely assassinated. And yet, Kuntar returned mostly as a hero, as someone worthy of admiration rather than contempt. I do not blame Hizbullah on this as much as I blame Allmerde and his entourage.

For the rest of this post, check out: Freedom’s Cost

‘Damascus and Beirut are heading toward normalization and full diplomatic relations for the first time in their modern history, which the Lebanese expect will usher in a relationship based on mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and the Syrians hope will improve their ties with the rest of the world,’ the ME Times reports. (more…)

For the second day in a row, government troops and Hezbollah terrorists clashed with each other in Lebanon, especially in the country’s capital Beirut. The Shiite terrorist organization ‘accused’ the government of declaring war on it, which sadly probably is not correct. (more…)

Nice: a couple of years ago Hizbullah and Israel went to war with each other. The result was that the Shi’ite terrorist organization was severely weakened and had lost many of its fighters. Aside from that, though, the organization had also proved that it could fight back against Israel and that Olmer is a weak leader; he could’ve crushed Hizbullah, but instead he decided to give in to international pressure, and let Hizbullah off the hook. Hizbullah suffered, but it also learned an important lesson; next time, it would be even stronger, and better prepared. (more…)

Just in case anyone was wondering…Yes, there is a war on and no, the other side isn’t exactly playing according to the Marquis of Queensbury rules of warfare. From the NY Times:

A powerful car bomb killed a senior Lebanese army general and his guard in an eastern suburb of Beirut on Wednesday, army officials said.

The general, Brig. Gen. Francois al-Hajj, was in charge of military operations during the battle against Islamic militants at the Nahr al Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon last summer.

(more…)

Ok, so can we maybe reach a bargain here?

If we can agree that President Bush is an idiot for comparing Iraq to Vietnam, can we please not compare the possibility of American withdrawal to The American Civil War?

Matthew Yglesias has done just that, in addition to drawing a parallel with the Lebanese Civil War. His reasoning goes as follows:

To say that our current policy is working and needs just ten more years to stabilize Iraq is lunacy — just leaving stands a perfectly good chance of working just as quickly at radically lower cost.

…

By a similar token, the American Civil War ended fewer than ten years after James Buchanan’s blunders. Ten years isn’t just longer than America has political will to sustain, it’s genuinely too long. Policies that work accomplish their goals faster than that, something that’s supposed to unfold at the speed Petraeus is talking about isn’t working at all.

“Policies that work accomplish their goals faster than that”? This is absurd. I would love to talk about the Korean War, and the gradual decline of Communism and other wonderful foreign policy analogies that disprove such a comment. But NO. No more.

As for Matthew’s examples, the Civil War comparison is just silly. We had a central government. We had the foundation for a liberal and democratic society already established, which is why secession from the union was bad. The Nullification Crisis had already established this. This was Lincoln’s rally cry, and he was right. The Constitution was on his side.

The Lebanese example is equally bad. The reason being is that you could flip it on its head, and use it as a reason to stay in Iraq. The Cairo Accord forced Lebanon to allow a terrorist organization to operate within their own borders, so that said terrorist organization could attack Israel by proxy. This “civil” war was in fact fueled in many ways by foreign elements, much the way Iraq has been exacerbated by Saudis, Iranians and other foreign fighters.

So please…let’s just stop. Rich does a nice job of handling the “Spanish Civil War” comparison. Bravo!

I know it’s tempting to look back. I am guilty as charged. But I think we’ve all gotten a little bit carried away trying to prove our own points via historical context. I will not do this again in the future, unless I can lay out a very detailed analysis to substantiate the comparison. Since I don’t have the attention span, nor the desire to do so, the entire enterprise is highly unlikely.

You’re probably better off.

(Cross posted at my blog)

CNN reports:

A member of the Lebanese parliament was killed in an explosion Wednesday outside a Beirut military sports club in what hospital sources called an assassination.

Lawmaker Walid Eido, known as a foe of Syrian involvement in Lebanon, his son, Khalid, and two of his bodyguards were killed, Lebanese media reports said.

At least six other people died and 11 were wounded in the explosion, believed to be from a car bomb, in the seaside neighborhood of Manara, according to Lebanese security sources.

Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, an outspoken critic of Syria, blamed Eido’s killing on Damascus, calling it an attempt to reduce the anti-Syrian majority in the Lebanese government.

Well that is obviously quite possible. The entire world knows (probably better to say ’strongly suspects’) that Syria is behind Hariri’s death. ‘Strangely’ enough, “Eido was a vocal supporter of the U.N. tribunal investigating Hariri’s killing, approved earlier this month by U.N. Security Council.”

Combine this with the violence in the Palestinian refugee camps and… a scary picture slowly but surely emerges.

Well, not that slowly, but very surely at least.

Lebanon is in the very real danger of, once again, falling into a civil war. This has to be prevented against just about all cost. I propose that the West gives the Lebanese government all the money and military support it needs to fight Hezbollah and other terrorists, especially Syria’s agents.

Michael j. Totten has, as usual, a fascinating post up about Al Qaeda (and Syria) in Lebanon:

Fatah al-Islam terrorists in the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp (which is an urban ghetto in Tripoli, not a tent city) are, reportedly, mostly not Palestinian. No one has suffered more from Lebanon’s worst fighting since the civil war ended than the Palestinian civilians of Nahr al-Bared. After decades as second-class non-citizens living in dejection and squalor, they are now human shields in a battle between foreign terrorists and the host country.

Lebanon’s freshest and most vicious of enemies have, if reports are correct, arrived from battlefields in Iraq via Syria. Their relationship with the Syrian state and Al Qaeda is murky and hard to sort out, but they do seem to have connections of some kind to both.

An Nahar reports that mosques there now are dual-use. They are places in which to pray. They are also armed camps. They are also, possibly, terrorist targets. Suicide bombers reportedly detonated themselves at the Thawra mosque. Perhaps someone ignited himself a little too early. Maybe the keepers of that mosque were hostile to Fatah al-Islam. I do not know.

The Lebanese Army is clearing the “camp” of terrorists, booby-traps, car bombs, and even domestic animals rigged with explosives. The government says there will be no negotiated truce with the enemy, that their crimes will be punished with the death penalty either in combat or later in prison. It has been years, decades really, since the government and army of Lebanon have shown this kind of resolve…

The Lebanese Army foiled so-called Plan 755 which, reportedly, was a plot by Tripoli’s salafists to massacre local civilians, sever the city’s links to Beirut, and enslave the residents who couldn’t get out.

In other words: if the Lebanese army wouldn’t have gone in, a disaster would have happened. Great decision, therefore, by the Lebanese government. I do wonder how to deal with this problem: it seems that both Al Qaeda and Syria are involved. If that is the case,we can expect more problems to arise in this most liberal of the Arab countries.

The Times (London) reports:

The Lebanese Army pounded the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp yesterday with heavy artillery in the opening phase of a long-anticipated final offensive to destroy a band of Islamist militants.

Thick plumes of black smoke rose from the camp as fires that were caused by shelling raged out of control. Militants from Fatah al-Islam, who have declared that they will not surrender, fought back with mortars and machineguns.

The Lebanese Government appears to have taken the decision to end the bloody two-week stand-off between the army and Fatah al-Islam after protracted negotiations with Palestinian and Lebanese religious intermediaries failed to achieve a peaceful resolution. The fighting, in which 78 people have been killed and dozens more wounded, is the worst since the end of the civil war in 1990.

With Lebanon beset by deep political divisions and a worsening security climate, the violence in the north has presented a grave challenge to the authority of the Lebanese Government as well as the small, underequipped and largely untested army.

CNN adds:

Lebanese soldiers — backed by gunboats, heavy artillery and rows of tanks — entered a Palestinian refugee camp that has hosted days of fierce fighting north of Tripoli, a military source said Friday…

Columns of tanks rolled nearby as Lebanese troops entered the northern edges of the refugee camp, breaking more than a week of relative calm in the fighting between the army and Fatah al-Islam, a militant group alleged to be linked to al Qaeda.

Troops also pounded the camp with 155 mm shells in what is the heaviest daytime artillery fire seen since the beginning of the campaign. Lebanese security sources said the militants were pinned down in one area.

Before the battle, 30,000 Palestinians lived in the camp. Approximately 20,000 of them fled, 10,000 Palestinians are still in the camp.

The Lebanese government has, in my opinion, made the right decision. It cannot afford to let the Fatah al-Islam terrorists to take over the camp completely. Lebanon already has a major problem with Hezbollah in the south, having another terrorist organization running parts of the north would be disastrous.

I am currently in the process of writing the final version of an essay about Bush, conservatism and neoconservatism. In my research, I stumbled upon this article at the Opinion Journal from 2005, written by Charles Krauthammer. It is a fascinating article in more than one regard: it provides us the opportunity to analyze the ideology of neoconservatives, but it also gives us a great opportunity to look back and see how confident neoconservatives were, only two years ago.

Krauthammer wrote:

In place of realism or liberal internationalism, the past 4 1/2 years have seen an unashamed assertion and deployment of American power, a resort to unilateralism when necessary, and a willingness to pre-empt threats before they emerge. Most importantly, the second Bush administration has explicitly declared the spread of freedom to be the central principle of American foreign policy. George W. Bush’s second inaugural address in January was the most dramatic and expansive expression of this principle. A few weeks later, at the National Defense University, the president offered its most succinct formulation: “The defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom.”

The remarkable fact that the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconservatism’s own transition from a position of dissidence, which it occupied during the first Bush administration and the Clinton years, to governance. Neoconservative foreign policy, one might say, has reached maturity. That is not only a portentous development, requiring some rethinking of principles and practice, but a rather unexpected one.

It is unexpected because, only a year ago, neoconservative foreign policy was being consigned to the ash heap of history. In the spring and summer of 2004, in the midst of increasing difficulties in Iraq, it was very widely believed that neoconservative policies had been run to the ground, that the administration that had purveyed them would soon be thrown out of office, and that internecine recriminations were about to begin over who lost the war on terror, the war in Iraq and indeed the reins of American foreign policy. One prominent columnist, speaking for the conventional wisdom of the moment, called the Bush project in Iraq “a childish fantasy.” And this, from a friend of neoconservatism.

As for the liberals who had come on board the project of liberating Iraq, they took its perceived foundering as an opportunity to engage in a mass jumping of ship. Some justified their abandonment of the Bush doctrine on the grounds that it was they who had been betrayed–by an administration whose incompetence, mendacity, political opportunism and various other crimes had ruined a policy that would already have been crowned with success if only they had been in charge of postwar Iraq, calibrating brilliantly precise troop levels, calculating to three decimal places the required degree of de-Baathification, and overseeing just about every other operational detail according to the dictates of their own tactical genius.

And goes on about liberals for a while, then:

The remarkable fact that the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconservatism’s own transition from a position of dissidence, which it occupied during the first Bush administration and the Clinton years, to governance. Neoconservative foreign policy, one might say, has reached maturity. That is not only a portentous development, requiring some rethinking of principles and practice, but a rather unexpected one.

It is unexpected because, only a year ago, neoconservative foreign policy was being consigned to the ash heap of history. In the spring and summer of 2004, in the midst of increasing difficulties in Iraq, it was very widely believed that neoconservative policies had been run to the ground, that the administration that had purveyed them would soon be thrown out of office, and that internecine recriminations were about to begin over who lost the war on terror, the war in Iraq and indeed the reins of American foreign policy. One prominent columnist, speaking for the conventional wisdom of the moment, called the Bush project in Iraq “a childish fantasy.” And this, from a friend of neoconservatism.

As for the liberals who had come on board the project of liberating Iraq, they took its perceived foundering as an opportunity to engage in a mass jumping of ship. Some justified their abandonment of the Bush doctrine on the grounds that it was they who had been betrayed–by an administration whose incompetence, mendacity, political opportunism and various other crimes had ruined a policy that would already have been crowned with success if only they had been in charge of postwar Iraq, calibrating brilliantly precise troop levels, calculating to three decimal places the required degree of de-Baathification, and overseeing just about every other operational detail according to the dictates of their own tactical genius.

Today, there is no euphoria regarding the Iraq project, but sobriety has replaced panic. Things have changed, and what changed them was four elections: two in the West, and two in the Middle East. First came the re-election in Australia of John Howard, a firm ally of the administration. This presaged the re-election of George W. Bush, which reaffirmed to the world America’s staying power, gave popular legitimacy to the Bush doctrine, and established a clear mandate to continue the democratic project. The refusal of the American people last November to turn out a president who, rejecting an “exit strategy,” pledged instead to remain until Iraqi self-governance had been secured, was a seminal moment.

The other two elections took place in the areas of our exertion: first the Afghan elections, scandalously underplayed by the American media, then the Iraqi elections, impossible to underplay even by the American media. The latter were a historical hinge point. After a string of other important steps in Iraq that had been confidently dismissed as impossible and certainly impossible to do on time–the writing of an interim constitution, the transfer of power to an interim Iraqi government–came the greatest impossibility of all: free elections as scheduled. The overwhelming popular turnout, in what was essentially a referendum on the insurgency and on the democratic idea, sent a clear-cut message. Those who had said that the Iraqis, like Arabs in general, had no particular interest in self-government were wrong–as were those who claimed that the insurgency was a nationalist, anti-imperialist and widely popular movement.

But it gets better:

Alliances with dictatorships were justified in the war against fascism and the Cold War, and they are justified now in the successor existential struggle, the war against Arab/Islamic radicalism. This is not just theory. It has practical implications. For nothing is more practical than the question: After Afghanistan, after Iraq, what?

The answer is, first Lebanon, then Syria. Lebanon is next because it is so obviously ready for democracy, having practiced a form of it for 30 years after decolonization. Its sophistication and political culture make it ripe for transformation, as the massive pro-democracy demonstrations have shown.

Then comes Syria, both because of its vulnerability–the Lebanon withdrawal has gravely weakened Assad–and because of its strategic importance. A critical island of recalcitrance in a liberalizing region stretching from the Mediterranean to the Iranian border, Syria has tried to destabilize all of its neighbors: Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and now, most obviously and bloodily, the new Iraq. Serious, prolonged, ruthless pressure on the Assad regime would yield enormous geopolitical advantage in democratizing, and thus pacifying, the entire Levant.

So, where are we at right now?

Bush has ordered a ’surge’ which will, most likely, last up to one year, the American people have stopped supporting him, they want “the troops” to “come home;” Democrats already put pressure on Bush to accept deadlines (although withdrew when Bush threated to veto it); it is considered to be unlikely that there will be many troops in Iraq by 2009, no matter what happens in the meantime; the war in Iraq works to the advantage of Democrats, and will be bad for the Republican nominee, whoever that will be in 08, etc., etc.

The confidence of Krauthammer, who wrote so arrogantly in 05, only two years ago, that Lebanon and Syria were next, was completely misplaced. The war in Iraq has proven to be a colossal failure and Charles and his neocon buddies have lost much of their influence. They were powerful for a couple of years, now it is time for them to go back to where they came from (University of Chicago anyone?).

Of course, there are neoconservatives who say that Bush’s problem is that neoconservatives do not have all that much power: they are mostly in the lower ranks, the real high ranks are not occupied by neoconservatives. Let me counter that by quoting Krauthammer:

Another important sign of the maturing of neoconservative foreign policy is that it is no longer tethered to its own ideological history and paternity. The current practitioners of neoconservative foreign policy are George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld. They have no history in the movement, and before 9/11 had little affinity to or affiliation with it.

The fathers of neoconservatism are former liberals or leftists. Today, its chief proponents, to judge by their history, are former realists. Ms. Rice, for example, was a disciple of Brent Scowcroft; Mr. Cheney served as secretary of defense in the first Bush administration. September 11 changed all of that. It changed the world, and changed our understanding of the world. As neoconservatism seemed to offer the most plausible explanation of the new reality and the most compelling and active response to it, many realists were brought to acknowledge the poverty of realism–not just the futility but the danger of a foreign policy centered on the illusion of stability and equilibrium. These realists, newly mugged by reality, have given weight to neoconservatism, making it more diverse and, given the newcomers’ past experience, more mature.

The Lebanese government has asked Fatah and Hamas to negotiate a deal with the terrorist organization that has taken over the Palestinian refugee camp Nahr al-Bared, Fatah al-Islam. If this doesn’t work, the army will get cart blanche to eliminate before mentioned terrorist organization.

Good decision I’d say: give them two days (or so) to work out a deal, if that doesn’t happen / work, go in and take out as many terrorists as possible.

Betsy Pitsik reports for the Washington Times:

The U.N. agency that oversees the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon, the scene of three days of battles between Lebanese troops and Muslim militants, said yesterday it had been aware for months that heavily armed foreigners were moving into the Palestinian enclave but were helpless to stop them.

The extremists of Fatah Islam, who local reports say hail from Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bangladesh, apparently entered the camp, just north of Tripoli, several months ago. They are thought to have arrived in a group, not individually.

Officials of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) could not say how a large band of foreigners carrying what has been described as mortars, rockets, explosive belts and other heavy weapons were able get past the Lebanese army soldiers stationed outside the camp.

They also could not explain why militias of young Palestinian men who provide security and gather intelligence throughout Nahr el-Bared and other Palestinian areas allowed foreign fighters to settle there.

Ed Morrissey, writing at Heading Right, rightfully concludes that “the UN once again shows itself to be useless when it comes to fighting international terrorism.”

I agree with Ed, even if providing security isn’t the responsibility of the UNRWA it should have, at least, informed the Lebanese government and other governments (about the infiltration of the camp by heavily armed foreigners). If governments would have been informed, and if they were allowed to take action, perhaps the current mess could have been avoided.

O, who would have thought? Suddenly, so it seems, Palestinian terrorists are fighting the Lebanese army.

Terrorist group Fatah al-Islam unleashed its fury on the Lebanese army today, killing at least 12 army soldiers and ISF members and wounding dozens of others, including civilians. The Syrian-backed group– made up of Syrian, Palestinian, Lebanese, Saudi and other Arab Islamists who arrived via Syria after terrorist tours in Iraq– has threatened to “open fire and volcanoes” on the army and on Lebanon that will not be “closed” as long as they have the mandate from their god.

Well, that was early yesterday. The Haaretz has more:

At least eight civilians were killed and 20 wounded on Monday in a Lebanese army shelling of a Palestinian refugee camp during fighting with Islamist militants, Palestinian sources inside the camp said.

They said the toll was certain to rise as some areas of the camp, home to some 40,000 refugees, could not be reached by rescue workers.

The shelling occured a day after 57 people were killed in battles there and in the nearby northern city of Tripoli, security sources said.

Tank shells crashed into the coastal camp, raising plumes of smoke, as fighters of the little-known Fatah al-Islam group fired grenades and machineguns at army posts on the camp perimeter, witnesses said.

At least 27 soldiers, 15 militants and 15 civilians died in Sunday’s violence, the worst internal fighting since Lebanon’s 1975-1990 civil war.

What I’m wondering about is… when will we hear people condemn Israel for this? I mean, sure, Israel hasn’t got anything to do with it directly, but that never stopped anti-Semites and anti-Zionists (mostly exact same thing) before.

Michael Young writes for The Daily Star:

We can thank the US speaker of the House, Nancy Pelosi, for having informed Syrian President Bashar Assad, from Beirut, that “the road to solving Lebanon’s problems passes through Damascus.” Now, of course, all we need to do is remind Pelosi that the spirit and letter of successive United Nations Security Council resolutions, as well as Saudi and Egyptian efforts in recent weeks, have been destined to ensure precisely the opposite: that Syria end its meddling in Lebanese affairs.

Pelosi embarked on a fool’s errand to Damascus this week, and among the issues she said she would raise with Assad - when she wasn’t on the Lady Hester Stanhope tour in the capital of imprisoned dissidents Aref Dalila, Michel Kilo, and Anwar Bunni - is “the role of Syria in supporting Hamas and Hizbullah.” What the speaker doesn’t seem to have realized is that if Syria is made an obligatory passage in American efforts to address the Lebanese crisis, then Hizbullah will only gain. Once Assad is re-anointed gatekeeper in Lebanon, he will have no incentive to concede anything, least of all to dilettantes like Pelosi, on an organization that would be Syria’s enforcer in Beirut if it could re-impose its hegemony over its smaller neighbor.

Michael’s conclusion:

erhaps Pelosi and other foreign officials will understand this simple equation one day, after again failing to persuade Assad to sell Hizbullah out. Unfortunately, foreign bigwigs come to town, their domestic calculations in hand; then they leave, and we’re left picking up the pieces.

And that’s really what this was all about, wasn’t it? Pelosi did what she did, not to help Lebanon, but to score points domestically. The sad reality of the situation is that Pelosi has made the situation worse by doing just about everything wrong.

She overreached tremendously.

More at Reason Magazine, Gateway Pundit and D.A. Ridgely.