PoliGazette reports from South Korea, about its northern neighbor and especially its leader Kim Jong.

Seoul, dreading the prospect of a collapsed North Korean ward spewing refugees and attracting Chinese mischief, and the US are are scrambling to agree on a military contingency plan, committing Washington to assist. Washington is focused solidly on nukes. If American conservative expat opinion counts for anything, that’s about all Washington should worry about up north, too. Japan is worried. Meanwhile, the world learns more about DPRK than it ever knew before. And, Pyongyang has not collapsed.

Many pundits, including myself, use metonyms, like “Pyongyang” for DPRK. It seems “Kim Jong-il” has become another. In place of concrete knowledge about the North Korean nation, western opinion has grasped conveniently for the one public figure comparable to his western counterparts western media can comprehend. Kim is chairman of the National Defense Commission and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army, but does this mean he ever was in control?

Kim’s medical condition is not known, and reports range from stroke to surgery. Japanese reports highlight how members of Kim’s extended family, including his brother-in-law, Jang Song-taek and fourth wife, Kim Ok, have assumed responsibilities. As a matter of fact, Japanese and South Korean sources vie for accuracy, and even Reuters offers speculation. One speculative opinion is, that hardliners have assumed control of the government. Faced with such uncertainty about Kim’s political power and his current medical condition, it’s convenient, if still possibly inaccurate, to assume the condition of the North Korean state is equally precarious.

Joshua Kurlantzick doesn’t address DPRK, but small-minded agendas sums up official reactions and commentary.

But today, the continent battles a kind of split personality. On the one hand, many cultural, economic and political trends suggest that Asian nations are becoming more integrated than ever before. But on the other, a virulent nationalism is spreading in the region, one that feeds on reinterpreted — or even imaginary — history to gin up hatred and push small-minded agendas.

DPRK exists in the shadows of this split perspective. It’s not a nation, rather it’s a demonic presence, or a lampoon. But, it very well could prove its ability to be a nation dealing with whatever Kim Jong-il’s condition is. The foremost example of this ability is the “huffing and puffing” Pyongyang exhibited right before reports of Kim’s failure to appear at the 60th anniversary of the North Korean state appeared. And, if that Reuters report is true, Pyongyang has been in crisis mode since April of this year, and no one suspected until now. Cover-up at least indicates competence of a sort. Perhaps, the metonym, “Kim Jong-il” no longer works.

And, maybe the ROK-US alliance is also dysfunctional. Robert Haddick, although he also uses the “Kim Jong-il” metonym, has written a thoughtful plan for dealing with North Korean collapse.

I have described reasons why China, South Korea, and the U.S. could get sucked into the North Korean tar pit in spite of the risks and costs of doing so. With all sides having strategic interests in the problem and obvious reasons for wishing to minimize their own costs and risks, it would seem to make sense for China, South Korea, the U.S., Japan, and others to cooperate now on planning for a post-Kim North Korea.

Although strict defenders of national sovereignty will object to the idea of a group of countries scheming over the collapse of another, the case of North Korea is too dangerous to ignore. Cooperative planning now might prevent a chaotic response later.

But even if these countries provide a smooth response to the collapse of the Kim regime, the strategic conflicts described above will still occur. A coordinated international relief expedition could provide humanitarian relief to North Korea, maintain order, prevent a refugee crisis, control the WMD stockpiles, and begin reconstruction. Yet it will take another level of diplomacy to prevent strategic conflict in the region, even after all of this important work is done.

I have only one objection. I might be self-interested. I have a family to protect in Busan. The prospect of North Korean economic collapse, followed by any number of scenarios, doesn’t make me smile. Frankly, I resent those who advocate gleefully for collapse from the comforts of their North American offices and homes. Many expats in ROK don’t have family, either. Like Seoul, I would prefer in the medium -term to see a stable North Korean state that isn’t a gulag or basket case. Instead of sharpening knives, Seoul, Moscow, and Beijing should contact rival factions and players within the North Korean state, like, say, Jang Song-taek, or even corps commanders in the provinces, at least to continue six-party talks on denuclearization. Dealing with the gulag masters is preferable to creating conditions no one can predict when the loss of human life and destruction could very well dwarf anything a tyrant could imagine in his demented fantasies. It could also be a confidence-building measure. If no one in the surrounding region, or the US, has the ability to handle a crisis, which seems to divide allies more than unite them, then perhaps propping up a regime will bring out more competence and consensus.

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