Establish the Facts in Georgia First
I have written previously that the United States and NATO need to take care not to be too aggressive in confronting Russia. The necessity of Russian cooperation — or at least acquiescence — on a range of issues from non-proliferation to counter-terrorism is simply too important to be sacrificed for purely emotional payoffs such as taking David’s side in the David-versus-Goliath confrontation in Georgia.
New information from a respectable and credible on-scene correspondant (full report here), however, causes me to begin to consider the limits of this view. While needless confrontation of Russia is certainly counterproductive, it must be balanced by a reasonable willingness not to let the Russians “run the table” by holding its cooperation with the West contingent upon the West’s acquiesence to what amounts to an aggressive Russian imperialism. Everything depends on carefully establishing what, exactly, the facts in Georgia are.
Two general versions of what happened in Georgia are emerging, and contrary to what partisans and ideologues claim, neither can be verified yet. But verification of those facts is essential in determining the direction of U.S. and NATO policy going forward.
Version one holds that Georgia poked the Russian bear by seeking a military solution for the Russian-supported breakaway region of South Ossetia. This is the dominant meme in the international media up until this point. Doubts that have so far been raised are just that — doubts. There is no proof that this dominant theme is untrue. It does appear to match the facts on the ground, including Russian reluctance to withdraw until it is certain that Georgian capability for further adventurism is controlled or eliminated.
If it is determined that Georgia acted first under the belief that its growing relationship with the United States and NATO gave it cover, Georgia should be informed in no uncertain terms that it miscalculated. The fundamental truth is that the United States and NATO need Russia more than they need Georgia — bald national interests determine the conclusion that Georgian adventurism cannot be rewarded by NATO nor should the consequences be compensated by the West except in humanitarian areas. George Washington famously warned about “entangling alliances” and such skepticism towards our erstwhile Georgian ally may be justified if this version of the facts does in fact turn out to be true.
Version two of the facts, however, holds that Russia concocted the Georgian attack by misrepresenting the order of events, casting Georgian defense efforts as an attack that required Russia’s devastating response. Once again, this version could fit the limited facts as we currently have them available, explaining both the suspiciously high level of Russian preparation for the alleged Georgian attack as well as Russia’s dramatic excess in territorial acquisition.
If it is determined that Russia acted first and concocted an elaborate lie to cover it up, western concern for its interest in cooperation with Georgia will have to be weighed against new doubts about the Putin regime’s trustworthiness. After all, the benefits available from cooperation would be substantially degraded by future examples of Russian dishonesty and deception. For example, Russian help in dealing with Iran might be substantially less valuable if Russia might be legitimately suspected of double-dealing, perhaps by publicly supporting containment efforts while secretly benefiting from black market nuclear trade with the Iranian regime.
So everything depends on determining the facts rather than jumping to conclusions. The read on the Georgian situation is complicated by a lack of access right now. Those on blogs who claim to know the facts for certain right now are almost always just partisans pushing an ideological agenda or, in the case of those obsessed with U.S. politics, just reading well-worn scripts. It will require some months of patience and investigation to be certain what scenario we face with Russia.
The troops that Russia used to carry out the invasion of Georgia were mover to the adjoining areas of Russia for “military exercises” in July 2008, that is several weeks before the alleged “provocation” by Georgia.
The invasion was clearly Putin’s desired outcome. The use of a Georgian attack as a reason is just an excuse. South Ossetia was previously a patchwork quilt of government and separatist held areas. There was often fighting between the two sides. Once the Russian army was in place all they had to do was wait and eventually there would be something to excuse the invasion.
Russian strategy is like a chess game. Georgia is strategic as it is one of the few regions which could provide Europe with oil and gas (especially gas) which bypasses Russia itself. This is a strategic move to increase Russia’s economic stranglehold over German gas supplies.
Russia is playing a long term game. Its primary objective is to turn Europe into a Russian sphere of influence. It is achieving this goal spectacularly well, largely because so much of the strategy is going undetected.
The basic method is divide and conquer. Most western European countries are much stronger than Russia economically, but all are relatively weak militarily. Putin’s strategy is to divide Western Europe from Eastern Europe, to allow him to absorb Eastern Europe.
When we were in Azerbaijan, Michael Totten, me and the others already had the idea this was what happened; the Azeris had more information than the West, seemingly. For instance; it seems likely that Russia used military bases in Armenia for its attack.
Michael’s decision to go there was a good one though; he told me in private that our ‘ideas’ have not only been verified, but that it is much worse than we thought; Georgia has truly been destroyed.