Tactics Overwhelm Strategy
I normally find rants about “neocons” and “warmongers” to be overheated partisanship at best and a peculiar type of dementia at worst. But the folks at the Weekly Standard or Commentary from time to time manage to provide some justification for the most scathing critiques of their overly aggressive foreign policy stance. Today, Stuart Koehl offers up a piece of analysis titled “The Pain Game”, which is appropriate, though likely not in the way he meant it. In truth, Koehl’s approach would offer pain — to Russia, certainly, but more seriously to the United States.
Koehl argues that the West has been too quick to assess the Georgian Crisis as one where effective military responses are not available. He advocates a program of military attrition, where U.S. military aid could serve to bleed dry the cream of Russia’s military forces:
A close examination of video and photos of the Russian force also reveals top of the line equipment–late model T-80 and T-90 main battle tanks, and BMP-2 IFVs. Now, the Caucasus Military District is something of a backwater, home of Category II and Category III divisions, most of which are kept below strength and equipped with older systems, such as the T-72 MBT. On the other hand, the Category I divisions are kept close to Moscow and the western military districts, because that is where the main threat is perceived, and also because that’s much better terrain for tank warfare. Obviously, the Russian army carefully transferred the forces for this operation from central Russia all the way to the Caucasus…
Having pulled back from Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Georgians can now regroup and re-equip. They are in desperate need of two things: weapons to kill tanks, and weapons to kill or deter aircraft and helicopters. We can supply both…
Pretty soon, Russian forces will be taking serious casualties. They will have to inject more troops to protect their lines of communication. They will have to get out of their troop carriers and climb up into the mountains, where they will take more casualties from an agile and elusive enemy…
Koehl’s scenario seems built to play upon romanticized notions of “Charlie Wilson’s War Redux”, providing support to indigenous fighters who can undertake a proxy war against Russia. The trouble is, Koehl confuses tactics with strategy, applying usable tactical skills from the 1980s to a post-Cold War strategic situation where the factors are different in innumerable ways.
First, Koehl’s scenario assumes a situation of pure competition with Russia similar to that with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. While it is certainly true that Putin has become increasingly authoritarian, the threat potentially posed by Russia to U.S. interests is a far cry from the comprehensive Soviet threat. Reacting as if it were risks creating what Koehl seeks to confront, a Russia bent once again on destroying the West rather than merely gaining back its self-respect.
Second, in addition to assuming Russian strength where in fact there is weakness, Koehl’s scenario assumes weakness where in fact there is Russian strength. Koehl’s reliance on tactics recycled from the 1980s conflict in Afghanistan assumes that there is now the same constraints on Russian reaction that existed then. He assumes, for example, that the relative rarity of the high-quality Russian arms currently on display in Georgia would remain rare if the U.S. started pouring in weapons. In truth, Russia now is not the tottering economic derelict of the late Soviet period. Instead, it is flush with wealth from oil and natural gas exports. If the U.S. were to arm Georgia, Russia would certainly undertake a massive expansion of its military capabilities in response.
Third, the illusion of “Red Dawn” anti-Russian tactics in Georgia risks provoking a broader Russian strategic response. Can anyone seriously believe that Russia would allow a proxy war with the United States to remain isolated to Georgia? At a minimum, Russia could use its outpost in Kalinigrad to threaten Poland and other U.S. allies in Eastern Europe. Russia could also renew its destabilization program in the Ukraine, attacking another near-NATO member in ways to which the U.S. would be hard-pressed to respond effectively. Russia could renew its claims to the Baltic states, threatening NATO directly with a choice between giving up its remaining credibility entirely or fighting a war against a nuclear power in defense of states with little strategic importance other than being NATO members.
Fourth, and most importantly, Koehl’s scenario assumes that the U.S. benefits more from confronting Russia than from finding areas of cooperation. Since 9/11, U.S.-Russian intelligence cooperation has quietly helped interdict al-Qaeda links with extremists from and transiting through Chechnya. Russia’s acquiescence is also essential in finding a way to restrain Iran’s possible nuclear ambitions, to secure its own massive arsenal of nuclear weapons materials, and to sustain other elements of what remains of post-Cold War stabilization institutions. To simply throw all that away in a fit of macho militarism in response to Russia’s actions in Georgia would be the height of strategic idiocy.
Tactics must serve strategy, and those who promote direct confrontation with Russia have yet to articulate a meaningful strategic vision.
Second
Unfortunately a lot of Americans just don’t realise that most people in the rest of the world don’t live in a big powerful country.
The left wing version of this is the deluded ramblings of Michael Moore about how Canada doesn’t have a big military like the US. No thought there for the fact that the US would almost certainly deploy all of its military resources to prevent any hostile invasion of Canada.
The right wing version is the delusion that small countries of the world have much of a chance when being crushed by their larger neighbours.
Georgia, even if it had the best army in the world, is only a country of about 4.5 million people. Russia has 142 million and massive air superiority. Georgia’s ability to fight back is limited enough, the fact that Russian troops on “ceasefire” still seem to be destroying Georgian military facilities means that its military capacities are now very small.
— In January 1968 Alexander Dubcek became First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, instituting the “Prague Spring” liberalising reforms —
In August the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact invaded, below, claiming that its assistance had been requested by Communist Party leaders. Dubcek was arrested —
Lyndon Johnson, the US President, declared the invasion in violation of the United Nations Charter, but America was in the middle of a presidential election campaign and a war in Vietnam. The West took no action
Seems eerily similar to Georgia doesnt it?
Not even a little bit. The Czech government in 1968 did not attempt to invade a breakaway area under Soviet protection. The Czech government in 1968 was not part of a NATO expansion. The Soviet government in 1968 was not invested in numerous cooperative projects with the United States. The Soviet government in 1968 was not part of a global economy. The Soviet government in 1968 could rely on a base on international support from numerous other countries.
Shall I go on?
What do you mean Russia is trying to gain back its self-respect? By waging a war against a tiny democratic nation that is no match for an overwhelming Russian force? You confuse self-respect for bullying. You don’t get respect by spreading terror and fear.
Self-respect in the eyes of many Russians means restoring Russian dominance over the "near abroad".
I don’t have to agree with it morally to recognize that their mindset exists. Perhaps you should see the world as it is, not as you wish it were. The Russians could care less for what you find to be "bullying".
Russian military policy makers openly declared Georgia’s strategic importance to Russian national security. Such statements raised suspicions that, as in 1801 and 1921, Russia would take advantage of Georgia’s weakened position and sweep the little republic back into the empire.
So when I look at your list of why this is not like Czech I have to ask myself considering I dont really know what Russia’s aims are, the government doesnt know what their aims are and the world is pretty fuzzy on what their aims are one can conclude that they are not as openly altruistic as they seem given past histories.
"Self-respect in the eyes of many Russians means restoring Russian dominance over the "near abroad". I don’t have to agree with it morally to recognize that their mindset exists. "
Of course, but it seems you are legitimizing the morality of their mindset. Who cares what the mindset of a bully is? Do you care what the mindset of a criminal is or do you seek to stop or mitigate his actions? Do you care what the mindset of a mugger is? Or do you take action to thwart his aspirations?
"Perhaps you should see the world as it is, not as you wish it were. The Russians could care less for what you find to be "bullying". "
The fact that you and other pundits for the past 8 years seem to have sanctioned their talks of intimidation and bullying is precisely why the world is how it is and not how it should be. Again, do you just let a mugger mug from you and just openly declare "well, it is how the world is". Great tactics buddy! For all your posturing over what a proper foreign policy should be I think you have no ideas for what to do other than to give in to this kind of bullying.
In no way am I doing so. I am recognizing that it exists and that our options for countering are limited by our capabilities as well as our own broader interests. Georgia went and kicked the local bully in the shins, perhaps under the assumption that an emotional reaction such as yours would provide them with an ally in the resulting aftermath. Well, I think they miscalculated what our national interests are.
Foreign policy built on nothing more than an emotional reaction to the so-called morality of others’ actions is highly dangerous. We need to consider how to get the most possible of what we want/need from Russia. And the cost-benefit analysis from seeking confrontation with them at this point in time is distinctly negative in my view.
"He assumes, for example, that the relative rarity of the high-quality Russian arms currently on display in Georgia would remain rare if the U.S. started pouring in weapons. In truth, Russia now is not the tottering economic derelict of the late Soviet period. Instead, it is flush with wealth from oil and natural gas exports. If the U.S. were to arm Georgia, Russia would certainly undertake a massive expansion of its military capabilities in response." You over estimate Russia’s economic capabilities. It has a GDP of 1.7 trillion (largely due to natural gas and oil which is nationalized and if new technologies prove to be a viable substitute, expect their GDP to go even lower in the future), compare that to the US which is 13.3 trillion GDP. Russia is also losing a half million people per year in their population. Comparatively then, if there were a new arms race they still could not compete with the U.S. Perhaps next time you can throw in a little data in your analysis.
http://www.globalissues.org/article/75/world-military-spending#USMilitarySpending
The US and Europe combined account for almost 70% of the world’s military budget. Russia comes in at a measly 5% of that total.
US military expenditures in recent years were roughly half a trillion dollars. Almost 30% of Russia’s entire GDP. As a percentage of American GDP, American military spending is only 4% of American GDP.
For all your posturing I don’t think know nearly enough as you think about tactics or strategy.
Nothing compares to United States GDP, Economy, and Military technology or equipment. No nation stands a chance against the United States. The only thing nations rely on is the hope that the United States will feel pressure from home not to take action.
Oh well, where might we find a man with J.F. K.’s brains and guts? When faced with a serious decision, with lasting implications, Russians will pull back. But we must show that we are ready to take care of business… which we are not. A lame duck president with a outgoing administration, an army stretched too thin, and weak congress… "oooo, say can you see…" Pathetic.
Jason, with all due respect, the “let’s respect Russia’s feelings” view of the world is a hubristic trap. It sees Russia as a small child who needs to be talked out of a tantrum. This is a gigantic underestimation of the subtlety and effectiveness of Russia’s strategy over the last years.
Lets imagine what it takes to get to be high up in the KGB. It would require good long term strategy, complete deviousness and utter ruthlessness. Putin has come from the best school that a trainee dictator could want. Lets now think of what it requires to be a leader in a democracy: popularity, short term decision making and a nice image. If a dictator and a democratic leader are in a long term conflict the dictator has a lot of advantages. The tendency of western leaders to patronise dictators and tyrants and pander to their feelings plays straight into their hands.
Putin is playing a chess game. We are only just realising that the game has started, when he is 2 moves away from checkmate.
Clearly this invasion was organized in advance and has been planned for some time. Clearly Georgia is a strategic area for control of Europe, which is Putin’s goal. I’m not saying that he will launch a military invasion of, say, Germany, he is far too subtle and devious for that. Instead he will continue his war of attrition against Europe, dividing it against itself, using Russian gas and business interests to buy or bully influence. Military power will be reserved for those who can’t fight back.
Next item on the Kremlin shopping list is the Ukraine. We need to let it into NATO before it is too late.
Yes, it would be stupid. Fortunately, I never said anything like that.
What I did say is that we should act in our OWN interests and those interests do not favor confrontation with Russia right now.
"Russia could also renew its destabilization program in the Ukraine, attacking another near-NATO member in ways to which the U.S. would be hard-pressed to respond effectively."
You act as if responding to intimidation begets more intimidation. I don’t know what else to call that other than appeasement. Not responding to intimidation will assuredly lead to more intimidation. A lack of a response to Russia’s belligerent actions against Georgia will not thwart Russian aspirations for a greater Russian empire. We are not causing Russian Imperialism, Putin and his cronies are causing Russian Imperialism.
"Koehl’s scenario assumes that the U.S. benefits more from confronting Russia than from finding areas of cooperation"
But the US has continuously tried to find areas of cooperation, including joint NATO-Russian military exercises, offering Russia to be part of a missile defense system, etc. Finding areas of cooperation didn’t stop Russia’s belligerence. You can’t cherry pick the evidence.
"Russia’s acquiescence is also essential in finding a way to restrain Iran’s possible nuclear ambitions"
Russia has continuously thwarted or watered down any UN resolutions against Iran, and has also sold arms to Iran. That is not a sign of a nation willing to cooperate with the rest of the free world over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.
No offense but it seems you didn’t do any of your homework on this.
I submit that you have no way of knowing how much "homework" I have done.
The issue is not whether to respond, but how. I contend that responding by confrontation will backfire by causing Russia to stop cooperating in the many other areas where we have common interests. You call this "appeasement" (an all-purpose pejorative that functions as a replacement for actual analysis). I call it calculating the pluses AND minuses and not exaggerating either one. I am not opposed to a negative response including diplomatic or even some economic sanctions. I am opposed to a counterproductive overreaction that sacrifices everything in the name of macho military posturing that won’t solve anything anyway.
It is fine that you disagree, but please do not insult my credentials again, especially in the absence of any knowledge on your part of what they even are.