Russia and Georgia: The Return of Realism
In international relations, the term “realism” refers to the notion that states will do what they feel they must to secure their material interests and, crudely put, to hell with what the rest of the world might think. “Liberalism”, by contrast, refers to the idea that states will seek to cooperate economically, socially, and politically whenever possible, choosing conflict only when there are few advantages to cooperation. Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, liberalism has reigned supreme. What U.S. President George H. W. Bush proclaimed as a “new world order” may have been in large part an aspirational myth, but there is little question that economic and cultural exchange became the dominant feature of the global system, as demonstrated so colorfully in the opening ceremonies of Beijing’s Olympics. Russia’s recent aggressiveness may signal the end of the era celebrated simultaneously in Beijing.
Some thought that U.S. aggressiveness in the aftermath of 9/11 presaged the retreat of liberal “globalization”, if not its end in the globe-spanning “war on terrorism”. But the reality of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq has been more about international cooperation and legitimacy than most critics of U.S. policy are willing to recognize. It is worth noting, for example, that even as the U.S. flaunted the will of the “international community” in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it took historically extraordinary steps to at least try to be seen as legitimate, assembling at great monetary expense a “coalition of the willing” that, apart from Britain, contributed relatively little in terms of additional usable combat power. And the U.S. went to the materially toothless United Nations not once, but twice, in a costly and fruitless effort to obtain a fig leaf of international legitimacy. Why would the U.S. even attempt such measures if not because a liberal outlook on international relations still held sway among its senior policymakers?
The liberal impulse in Washington and around the globe has only intensified in the second term of the Bush administration. Conflicts with North Korea and Iran have departed starkly from the predictions of those who see a militarized U.S. empire seeking to dominate and control all within its reach. Instead of featuring military saber-rattling, Washington has allowed Europeans to take the lead in negotiations with Iran and has encouraged China to dominate the scene with regards to North Korea. Even Putin’s Russia seemed for a long time to be playing a similar liberal game in international relations, building a cooperative relationship with former rival China through the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Trade and multilateralism continued to dominate even in the age of the so-called “global war on terrorism”.
That environment is what makes the Russian invasion of Georgia so inexplicable. Regardless of which side one chooses to blame for the outbreak of warfare in the Caucasus, it is difficult to see what either party hoped to gain in liberal terms. The conflict seems certain to be far more disruptive economically than can be justified by any potential benefit. More importantly, it is notable how neither side shows much concern for issues of legitimacy or international approval. Instead, Russia in particular seems fixated on a hard-power world where it can dominate simply by virtue of its greater material power and can dismiss outright the international condemnation that pours forth.
In the last days of Putin’s presidency (which continues in puppet-master form since Putin has moved over to Prime Minister), Russia showed an apparent desire to return to the realist heyday of the Cold War. Russia began to reinvest its burgeoning oil wealth in military upgrades and restarted the practice of harassing U.S. forces throughout the world with aircraft overflights. Putin also adopted an increasingly menacing stance towards Russia’s neighbors, threatening former client states in Eastern Europe with nuclear attack if they host a U.S. missile defense system even though it could not possibly trump Russia’s massive nuclear force, cutting off oil and natural gas shipments as a way of pressuring Ukraine, and now embracing the invasion options as a way of reasserting its territorial dominance over the Caucasus. There is no sign that Russia either seeks or cares about the response of the international community. Russia appears to have embraced realism instead.
While it will take a couple more weeks to be sure, it appears possible if not likely that Russia will seek to dominate only only South Ossetia, but all of Georgia. And if that happens, concerns about the return of a Russian empire established and held by military force will grow serious. At a minimum, the world must now face the end of the liberal dreams of globalization and the possibility of a rapid return to the grim days of realist thinking among the world’s statesmen.
How very "unbiased"….
I honestly can’t understand what drives people like You to write such hate speeches. "The good old Uncle Sam wants a better World, while on the other hand, the Russian anti-democratic bear wants to bully little nations". That’s what I gather from the text at least.
Can I please ask if Kosovo is independent today?
Wasn’t it once a part of Serbia?
Didn’t Uncle Sam, along with his mates bomb what was then Yugoslavia? And using unconventional weapons while at it?!
If I remember correctly, even the serbian television and it’s journalists were "legitimate targets". And non-military personnel killed in the krieg were mere "collateral victims".
And how many americans lived in Kosovo at the time?
When You answer my questions, I’ll say You’re an analyst. And not before that.
Thanks
Please find a single quotation from my post where I cast blame on anyone or say that anyone in the conflict was behaving wrongly. In fact, find ANY normative language in my post or else retract your accusation of bias. I never said anything about either realism or liberalism being a “better world” at all. Also, find anywhere in this post where I even mentioned (let alone endorsed) bombing Yugoslavia or intervening in Kosovo.
If you cannot find such a quotation, I will conclude that your comment (and any others like it) were merely pre-scripted responses posted without regard to what I actually said. Any such comments may be deleted as spam and their posters can be banned. I am tired of putting up with script-mongering trolls and I won’t tolerate them any more.
editor: As previously announced, comments which misrepresent the content of the post and/or attack the poster are deleted and the commenter banned. Editors of newspapers and magazines to not publish letters to the editor that misrepresent the articles they are responding to or which attack the newspaper or magazine either. I choose not to provide publicity for spammers and trolls.
Well reasoned and logical post. Good job, Jason. This goes beyond my post on the reasons why the USA was unlikely to intervene on Georgia,but makes an couple of important points:
The concept of liberal democracy was the predominant approach to foreign policy for most of the Western democracies for the past fifteen years, but the old realism may replace it soon following the recent events. While much of Europe has complained about US imperialism, in fact there has been precious little of it for twenty years. The challenge for the Western democracies will be to work to meet their energy and resource needs while lessening their dependence on regimes whose policies they find at odds with their publicized values. The problem will be finding ways to make less use of Russian natural gas and oil, less use of middle eastern oil, and raw materials from the African continent. This is not going to be easy. However, the problem with enriching any of these regimes is obvious - it strengthens governments which are not democratic, at the expense of the democracies. And, as is often the case with democracies, the West seems very reluctant to consider the reality that they may have to defend their way of life at great expense in blood and treasure.
Russia has never had a history of democratic government, so it should be no surprise that it has returned to its authoritarian ways. Unless and until the Russians chose to change their manner of governing, it is unreasonable to expect western style democracy to form there. I’d say the evidence says the Russian people are more interested in the security of the old empire than the challenges of democracy and free markets. It will be interesting to see if the Chinese move closer to democracy along with their increasing world trade, but I’m not especially optimistic. The concept of liberal democracy as practiced in the West is facing a lot of challenges.
I actually consider it at least plausible to talk about a "liberal imperialism" led by the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. Contrary to the claims of the drive-by script-mongers who keep trying to hijack this thread, my point was not to make a simplistic, caveman-level "U.S. good, Russia bad" grunt, but rather to evaluate the potential reshaping in the set of assumptions that dominates the international system. During the Cold War, that set of assumptions on ALL sides was realism. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been liberalism. Russia’s new moves to reestablish its own empire and to challenge the hegemony of liberalism in the international system indicate to me that at least one major world power may be returning to realism, thus forcing a reassessment by other actors.
All these points are normatively neutral and do not imply an endorsement of any party to any conflict. The sooner some people get that, the sooner they can start thinking seriously about the situation instead of just reacting emotionally. It is not in fact the case that liberalism is "good" or that realism is "bad". They are competing intellectual paradigms that are morally neutral. But they have serious consequences for the real world that need to be thought about and talked about.
The Chinese are an interesting case. On the one hand, they have a long-standing intellectual tradition of realism in their foreign policy approaches. It goes back thousands of years, in fact, to a time before "realism" had even been conceived of as such, before even the writing of Thucydides. On the other hand, as was on bright display during the opening ceremonies, China is increasingly seeking an opening to the world that is primarily trade-oriented but also appears to have very substantial cultural elements.
So far, China’s foreign policy remains relentlessly realist (e.g. Sudan, Tibet). But there are early signs of a possibility of an emerging liberal alternative (e.g. Hong Kong, North Korea, Taiwan).
I agree that China is a very different case, and we need to be careful about lumping China in. Yes, China also has a realist history, but the Chinese also have a progressive and technological streak that’s quite impressive. Chinese inventions like paper, gunpowder, the compass were crucial for the West’s own predominance after the Portuguese and Spanish hit the waves in the 1400’s. And today, China’s case is very much unique. I’ve worked there and while the government is authoritarian, people are fairly free there just so long as they don’t stir up serious disruption. And although reforms are needed– political prisoners should be freed unless they’ve committed violent crimes, and there needs to be more freedom of the press to provide constructive criticism on things like intellectual property and the environment– China is constantly improving.
As far as democracy, China is moving in that direction too, but in a very different way from the USA. China’s getting the independent judiciary, checks and balances, rule of law– but elections are more restricted. China instead prefers a kind of "meritocratic selection" for people in government, which may be smart. Think about it– here in the USA, our politics is dominated by stupid sound bites rather than long-term thinking, our politicians are bought by corporations and lobbyists, and our elections are dumbed-down, with ethnic blocs and superficial considerations outweighing true merit in choosing leaders. So we don’t deal with budget, environmental issues, as they slowly eat away and destroy us as a nation.
So China’s mixed, sui generis system may be more capable of dealing with real problems.
Also, Jason– while I agree with your concern about Russia, and don’t in any way condone what is at best a militaristic overreaction in Georgia, at the same time, Iam has a good point.
US, British and Australia recognition of Kosovo needlessly provoked and angered Russia into doing a tit-for-tat in South Ossetia. We have gained absolutely nothing in Kosovo and taken on tremendous costs. It’s a non-viable narcostate that specializes in human smuggling and gun-running, run by the terrorist KLA. We’re spending tens of millions every year to subsidize it. By UNHCR 1244, Kosovo is part of Serbia, and the vast majority of the world doesn’t recognize it. Not only Russia but most democracies like Brazil and India, plus Indonesia, Spain, Greece and a host of other nations.
We needlessly provoked Russia for no strategic gain at all. By UN Resolutions, Kosovo is still part of Serbia, an ancient cradle of Serb civilization. We should stop with this foolish notion of an independent Kosovo, make it autonomous, and leave it at that. Then, Russia would have less of a basis for interfering in South Ossetia. Heck, even the UK and USA are vulnerable to a Kosovo precedent– Scotland and Ireland are looking to break from Britain, while Hawaii, Alaska, the US Southwest (Mexican War), Lakota Sioux, Vermont and many others have been looking to break from the USA, aboriginals from Australia and so forth. In encouraging Kosovo, we’ve even signed our own death warrants as nations.
Right now, we look like weaklings here, as we really can’t do anything to Russia here, relying on their natural gas. We look as though we’ve betrayed Georgia– they gave us their troops to fight and be killed or wounded in Iraq, and we’re doing nothing for them. We look like weak fools– and we could have avoided all this by not committing such stupidity in Kosovo, and by trying less to consciously provoke Russia. We’ve made much of our own bed here.
"China instead prefers a kind of "meritocratic selection" for people in government, which may be smart."
I too would prefer selection of our leaders based solely on merit and what they’ve done.
If China can provide that for its leaders, plus ensure fair and free elections, it would be a good thing to see.
I’m hung up on your definitions of realism and liberalism, before I can even get to a discussion of South Ossetia. For realism, Jason has singled out Morgenthau’s third principle about interest in terms of survival. But for the utopian foil, Jason has replaced liberalism. Isn’t this a straw man argument? Liberalism and realism clash over a range of theoretical issues, like levels of analysis and the relationship between politics and the market. Realism and liberalism also have competing notions of conflict and cooperation. Jason has robbed liberalism of its right to challenge realism, and impoverished realism. Jason is in the ballpark, as much as the notion, post-1991, that IGOs, like NATO, the EU, and UN, are subjects of realist-liberal contention. Is the UN a reflection of the underlying dynamics of the current world order? Or, are states failing to implement the norms the UN represents, and that individual citizens in the world espouse, against ethically indefensible actions. If that is Jason’s intent, then let the debate proceed!However, I would ask two more theoretical questions to Jason. Firstly, if he means a return to realism, then is he arguing that politics trumps economic interests? Or, in liberal terms, are economic interests in Russia motivating this military action? Secondly, what role does geography and history play? Is this only a theoretical game, like a chessboard? Or, does the mountainous terrain between two seas, containing fragile boundaries between distinct ethnic conclaves count for more?I would favor the latter two disjuncts. I would argue that, post-1991, there’s a recurrence of geostrategy over ideology by bureaucratic elites and personalities that render the notions of Russian and Georgian statehood very tenuous. I doubt Russia is a "state", more a collection of baronies, corporations, and individuals, and Georgia is not yet a state, if it ever will be one. I doubt realism would apply here, because there are no state interests to discern.
Balti,
You are completely correct that I have dramatically oversimplified the content of liberalism and realism as taught and studied at graduate schools in international relations. In doing so, I certainly undermined and perhaps even corrupted the theoretical debates that occur between scholars. But I plead a purpose in doing so: My goal was to describe how those paradigms are broadly interpreted and implemented by policymakers, not academicians.
In policymaking, nuanced scholarly theories become reduced to bare essentials. In international relations, liberalism becomes focused upon the value of institutions in managing the world, including the management of conflict and the conferring of legitimacy. Realism becomes reduced to the rejection of institutions and the pursuit of national interests through other means. My argument then is that while it is too soon to be certain, Russia’s actions in Georgia and elsewhere may indicate a shift among an important part of the global policymaking elite in favor of hard material power and away from use of institutions.
I would argue that this holds true even if we recognize the ethnic heterogeneity of Russia, Georgia, and other states. Even while such differences require us to be aware of other potential actors, the actions of the governments of states still pack a big whallop in the real world.
I would be interested in seeing how Obama and McCains strategies relate to these events. I have always thought that Obama was an Idealist in foreign policy and that McCain is somewhere between Realist and Neoconservative.
"Neoconservative" is a term without meaning in international relations. It is actually Wilsonian liberalism with a military edge — "making the world safe for democracy" and all that.
But in practice, it is useless to describe anything accurately since all that it usually communicates is pejorative intent on the part of the speaker. I generally refuse to use it or to engage those who toss it around as a weapon. I think McCain is best described as a neoclassical realist, which is a realist with a few liberal tendencies at the margins.
As for Obama, I think his overall approach is under development, but is generally conventionally neoliberal. Idealism is a dustbin-of-history term that really survives in the distorted “neoconservative” variant that is better described as Wilsonian liberalism.
I would ask you to consider the ongoing events in Mindanao before you make a global case. I think the history of the US-Soviet relations force this "return to realism".
Can you explain the relevance of Mindanao (part of the Philippines, no?)?
Both the Russia-Georgia and RP-Mindanao conflicts have centuries-old origins that include ethnic, religious, and economic issues. Both cases exhibit a continuum of integration and separation over the course of these histories. Both cases have exhibited an intensification of low-intensity warfare in the last decade, and in both cases the stronger power has invaded. But, in Mindanao’s case, the US has assisted the AFP to fight separatist and Muslim extremists groups. The recent RP-MILF MOA has excited regional interest, especially Japan and Malaysia to end the conflict. The MOA’s status is now hanging on the RP Supreme Court’s ruling on its constitutionality. In both cases events are connected to two leaders, Putin and Arroyo, alleged to have used these respective military campaigns to maintain and extend their terms of office and power. Both cases have excited nationalist aspirations in both states, as well as in the beleaguered opponents.
The difference is, that, in the Russia-Georgia case, the debate is dominated by a "return to Cold War" meme, a "neocon" meme, and to a lesser extent, an "oil" theme. Because of the RP Sc’s ruling on the MOA, the MIndanao case has exposed more overtly the interests of the various branches of government and the machinations of various leaders. The blogosphrere debate is also engaged, as well as regional states and the US. There is also an "oil" meme, because both pro-and-anti-MOA groups fear international exploitation of Mindanao’s resources, if Mindanao is granted autonomy. Some of this is due to the opacity of the Russian and Georgian states.
Sorry, Balti, I don’t see the relevance between what you describe as happening on Mindanao and my post. The link appears only to be that both involve instances of ethnic conflict. Um. Ok.
I can see the relevance of what Balti is pointing to but have to agree that it is not relevant to the post by Jason although what Balti points out is intriguing and in and of itself is the subject for an entire discussion.
I love to read intelligent people having intelligent discussions without getting into angry shouting matches.
More please. It is informative and enlightening.
Re: "what makes the Russian invasion of Georgia so inexplicable. Regardless of which side one chooses to blame for the outbreak of warfare in the Caucasus, it is difficult to see what either party hoped to gain in liberal terms."
Well, it doesn’t make sense to you because you can’t appreciate that the Russians are disgusted and outraged at US hypocrisy belligerence and illegality in the Balkans, and see NATO-creep in the Caucasus and Black Sea region as a serious threat.
Your comments are very interesting. Can you provide evidence of Russian Foreign policy being realist? Can you make use of theories within the realist perspective to explain why we are going back to realism and not simplify the content of realism?
Thank you.