According to Henry Kissinger, the situation in Iraq has changed so dramatically in the last couple of months that the political debate (between John McCain and Barack Obama) about this subject are nearly useless.

Both men, seemingly especially Obama according to Kissinger, are using ‘premises that have been overtaken by events.’

Almost all objective observers agree that major progress has been made on all three fronts of the Iraq war: Al-Qaeda, the Sunni jihadist force recruited largely from outside the country, seems on the run in Iraq; the indigenous Sunni insurrection attempting to restore Sunni predominance has largely died down; and the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad has, at least temporarily, mastered the Shiite militias that were challenging its authority. After years of disappointment, we face the need to shift gears mentally to consider emerging prospects of success.

He admits that we don’t know ‘whether these changes are permanent or whether, and to what extent, they reflect a decision by our adversaries, including Iran, to husband their forces for the aftermath of the Bush administration.’ But, he goes on to write, ‘we do know that the outcome of the conflict will determine the kind of world in which the new administration will have to conduct its policies. Any appearance that radical Islamic forces were responsible for a U.S. defeat would have enormous destabilizing consequences far beyond the region. How and when to leave Iraq will therefore emerge as a principal decision for the new president.’

In this regard, he argues, it is important to point out that ‘the Sunni part of Iraq has created local forces backed by several Sunni states to fight al-Qaeda and indigenous insurgents. These, in turn, have contributed to easing Sunni concerns over being marginalized by the Shiite majority. All along, the Kurdish region has developed its own self-defense forces.’

The above has resulted in a calmer and more stable Iraq meaning that ‘the need for American forces in dealing with a massive insurrection has diminished, they can increasingly concentrate on helping the Iraqi government resist pressures from neighbors and the occasional flare-up of terrorist attacks from al-Qaeda or Iranian-backed militias. In that environment, the various national and provincial elections foreseen for the next months in Iraq’s constitution can help shape new Iraqi institutions.’

A strategic reserve can now be created by the United States out of some of the forces currently in Iraq, with some moving to other threatened areas and others returning to the United States. American deployment is transformed from abdication into part of a geopolitical design. Its culmination should be a diplomatic conference charged with establishing a formal peace settlement. Such a conference was first assembled two years ago on the foreign ministers’ level. It was composed of all of Iraq’s neighbors, including Iran and Syria; Egypt; and the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. That conference should be reassembled and charged with defining an international status for Iraq and the guarantees to enforce it.

In addition, regional efforts to stabilize the situation are underway. Turkey is seeking to mediate between Israel and Syria; a Qatari initiative has achieved at least a temporary pause in the fighting in Lebanon.

Establishing a deadline is the surest way to undermine the hopeful prospects. It will encourage largely defeated internal groups to go underground until a world more congenial to their survival arises with the departure of American forces. Al-Qaeda will have a deadline against which to plan a full-scale resumption of operations. And it will give Iran an incentive to strengthen its supporters in the Shiite community for the period after the American withdrawal. Establishing a fixed deadline would also dissipate assets needed for the diplomatic endgame.

The above is true, but has always been true. It is one of the most easiest ways to shoot down any plan for withdrawal. In this war, and in all other wars to come.  Additionally it could be said that America and the West as a whole have to come up with their own plans, which are not dependent on what others may think or do.

Having said that, the situation has indeed changed, and it seems that the talk about establishing order by using American troops is now outdated; this is what the debate has always been about. However, these troops and American power, strength and knowledge in general, can now be used in other ways. On that, I agree with Kissinger.

So is Kissinger right that the debate between McCain and Obama is fairly useless? I think he is. A new approach is needed, because the ‘war’ has entered a new phase. A phase, you could say, in which the country is rebuild. Rebuilding a country requires forces, but not forces that are out there to fight (constantly). They are more like peacekeepers and security guards.

The main question remains, though; are Iraqis ready for democracy (in their own way)? Has Iraqi culture changed so much that the Iraqi people can handle democracy and even embrace it?

That debate is not useless.