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	<title>Comments on: Contemplating a Post NATO World</title>
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	<description>News and Analysis from Different Moderate Perspectives</description>
	<pubDate>Thu, 08 Jan 2009 15:37:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: red alliance</title>
		<link>http://www.poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-53153</link>
		<dc:creator>red alliance</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 May 2008 22:36:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-53153</guid>
		<description>[...] of their own populations. And if Afghanistan is a red line that NATO must prove its worth or perish,http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/Code Red Alliance Killboard - Week 21Red Rodgers Stars, Skyly Deadly Addiction, A2-V27 0.0, 20:47, [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] of their own populations. And if Afghanistan is a red line that NATO must prove its worth or perish,http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/Code Red Alliance Killboard - Week 21Red Rodgers Stars, Skyly Deadly Addiction, A2-V27 0.0, 20:47, [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Benjamin</title>
		<link>http://www.poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-19702</link>
		<dc:creator>Benjamin</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 26 Jan 2008 16:47:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-19702</guid>
		<description>http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1468/

The report in question is not some mysterious secret, and is not about nuclear weapons either. Your 'analysis' is simply derivative of inaccurate gossip floated by the Guardian. 

The report, entitled 'A Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership' was launched publicly at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on January 10th, and can be downloaded from their website. See the link above, where you can also download an audiofile of the dicussion that followed. 

If the author of the article above would consider reading the report, then he would notice that this pamphlet is  about the complexity of global challenges, the importance of non-military means and conflict prevention, and it presents a new idea of strategy that integrates all instruments of power, both military and non-military for a strategy of 'preventive protection'.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1468/" rel="nofollow">http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_events/task,view/id,1468/</a></p>
<p>The report in question is not some mysterious secret, and is not about nuclear weapons either. Your &#8216;analysis&#8217; is simply derivative of inaccurate gossip floated by the Guardian. </p>
<p>The report, entitled &#8216;A Grand Strategy for an Uncertain World: Renewing Transatlantic Partnership&#8217; was launched publicly at the Center for Strategic and International Studies on January 10th, and can be downloaded from their website. See the link above, where you can also download an audiofile of the dicussion that followed. </p>
<p>If the author of the article above would consider reading the report, then he would notice that this pamphlet is  about the complexity of global challenges, the importance of non-military means and conflict prevention, and it presents a new idea of strategy that integrates all instruments of power, both military and non-military for a strategy of &#8216;preventive protection&#8217;.</p>
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		<title>By: Gary H. Rice</title>
		<link>http://www.poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-19022</link>
		<dc:creator>Gary H. Rice</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2008 14:58:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-19022</guid>
		<description>HALLMARKS OF SUCCESSFUL COIN STRATEGIES

The Manley Panel convened last fall by Prime Minister Stephen Harper has now had its say about how it sees the way forward in Afghanistan. What comes next is the Prime Minister?s response to the Panel?s recommendations. Shortly thereafter, Parliament will render its judgement on the future of the mission itself. With this in mind it is important that Parliamentarians, as well as Canadians at large, have an understanding of what they should look for when weighing the merits of any future strategy for waging an irregular or counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. In brief, what are the hallmarks of a successful Afghanistan COIN strategy?
 
An effective COIN strategy is accomplished in stages, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, community by community, city by city, province by province, region by region. The rate at which you develop local capacity drives the exit strategy. The faster effective indigenous security forces can be stood up and effective governance structures put in place the shorter the campaign. 

In Malaya, the emergency extended from 1948 to 1960. But the Malayan Communist Party did not surrender until 1989. The British were there for 12 years, but 30 more years elapsed during which the insurgents remained and still threatened from the Thai-Malay border. Nevertheless violence was reduced to a level where they could not threaten the existence of the Malayan state .

To help understand how a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) battle is waged it is first necessary to recognize that unlike two-sided conventional warfare where the focus is on struggles that seek to overcome an enemy by undermining and breaking his will to fight, outmanoeuvring him, and when necessary destroying his war making ability, counterinsurgencies concentrate their energies on a population rather than on the insurgents. The better the population is protected the less effort and resources it takes to deal with the insurgents.
 
A strong local ally with roots in the society, local support, and local men and women who are willing to get the job done is also required. In Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, a capable leader, with a tribal base, and respect in the Pashtun community was chosen in a Loya Jirga to become the interim leader, and later confirmed by the democratic national election. He then got the support of the international community via the Bonn process and allied partners. The result is a solid national political leader at the top on which to craft the security, economic, and governance programs needed to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign.
 
In counterinsurgency campaigns boots on the ground are the commander?s tools; they are not his strategy. 

A counterinsurgency campaign?s strategy gives priority to devising ways and means to motivate the population to themselves turf out the insurgents. This is accomplished by tasking troops to protect the population and separate the insurgents from them.
 
The reason for this is the enemy can always move but the population cannot. In a conventional battle something that must be defended must first be successfully attacked and then exploited by subsequent manoeuver. But in counterinsurgency there is nothing the insurgent has to defend. When pressed too closely insurgents can just flee the field, go into hiding, and remain in the area to fight another day. 

On the other hand, the population, with its farms, livestock, crops, homes, relatives, and businesses must stay put. The result is you cannot defeat an insurgency by simply fighting insurgents, it's like endlessly searching for a needle in a haystack, and ending up by destroying it to find the needle. 

If you follow this tack, the population becomes alienated, a recruitment base for the insurgents is established, and another cycle of destruction begins. So, the overarching counterinsurgency strategy is to work with the population. This may be accomplished, as it was in Iraq, for example, by first ?surging? the number of troops to a level that allows them to selectively drive out the enemy. They then focus back on the population and help restructure its environment so that the insurgent cannot return when you leave.
 
To prevent the insurgents return also calls for counterintelligence work to search out the stay behind sleeper cells, and the troops? collaboration as partners with the population and its leadership in their communities and where they can see that their security needs are being met. It also requires that bargains and mutual agreements be struck with community leaders in terms of their commitment to help drive out insurgents and defend themselves. 

The goal is to persuade the population to defend itself so that the insurgent can no longer find a safe haven, or are able to control or intimidate. That's the fundamental activity of counterinsurgency. Insurgents strive to make the population react in ways that are favourable to them, e.g., lend support, sympathize with their cause, and help intimidate the unconvinced. When they are denied such support by the population, however, it becomes extremely difficult for them to advance their aims. That is the reason why it is not just a matter of putting more boots on the ground, it is what the troops do when they get there that matters. And what they must do once they have moved into an area is remain there. 

Troops must live with the population, partner with it, help it to defend itself, help it to keep the insurgents out and from coming back, and help it restructure the community's environment to ensure the insurgent are kept out of it. There must be no doubt in the minds of the population that the enemy might one day come back.
 
In Afghanistan the NATO/ISAF strategy must be one with the Afghan government and AFNS (Afghan National Security Forces - Army &#38; Police). Together, they must guarantee that they will be able to protect the population so the enemy cannot return. And killing insurgents is one of the best ways of convincing the population that their antagonist is not going to come back. 

This cannot be accomplished by a strategy that focusses only on the delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects. It is fundamentally about political manoeuver; demonstrating longevity to the population so that they feel confident to work with their government 

Measured against the key elements that constitute a successful COIN strategy it becomes readily apparent that thus far the Canadian Forces in Kandahar have got it right.
 
But, Insurgencies do not end like conventional warfare. The enemy is not defeated on a battlefield. There is no victory parade. Instead the insurgent threat is reduced to a level at which the government can handle it. 

Then, and only then, will our troops have successfully accomplished Canada?s mission in Afghanistan and be able to honourably return to their barracks and the welcoming arms of a thankful nation.
-30-</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>HALLMARKS OF SUCCESSFUL COIN STRATEGIES</p>
<p>The Manley Panel convened last fall by Prime Minister Stephen Harper has now had its say about how it sees the way forward in Afghanistan. What comes next is the Prime Minister?s response to the Panel?s recommendations. Shortly thereafter, Parliament will render its judgement on the future of the mission itself. With this in mind it is important that Parliamentarians, as well as Canadians at large, have an understanding of what they should look for when weighing the merits of any future strategy for waging an irregular or counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. In brief, what are the hallmarks of a successful Afghanistan COIN strategy?<br />
 <br />
An effective COIN strategy is accomplished in stages, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, community by community, city by city, province by province, region by region. The rate at which you develop local capacity drives the exit strategy. The faster effective indigenous security forces can be stood up and effective governance structures put in place the shorter the campaign. </p>
<p>In Malaya, the emergency extended from 1948 to 1960. But the Malayan Communist Party did not surrender until 1989. The British were there for 12 years, but 30 more years elapsed during which the insurgents remained and still threatened from the Thai-Malay border. Nevertheless violence was reduced to a level where they could not threaten the existence of the Malayan state .</p>
<p>To help understand how a successful counterinsurgency (COIN) battle is waged it is first necessary to recognize that unlike two-sided conventional warfare where the focus is on struggles that seek to overcome an enemy by undermining and breaking his will to fight, outmanoeuvring him, and when necessary destroying his war making ability, counterinsurgencies concentrate their energies on a population rather than on the insurgents. The better the population is protected the less effort and resources it takes to deal with the insurgents.<br />
 <br />
A strong local ally with roots in the society, local support, and local men and women who are willing to get the job done is also required. In Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, a capable leader, with a tribal base, and respect in the Pashtun community was chosen in a Loya Jirga to become the interim leader, and later confirmed by the democratic national election. He then got the support of the international community via the Bonn process and allied partners. The result is a solid national political leader at the top on which to craft the security, economic, and governance programs needed to conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign.<br />
 <br />
In counterinsurgency campaigns boots on the ground are the commander?s tools; they are not his strategy. </p>
<p>A counterinsurgency campaign?s strategy gives priority to devising ways and means to motivate the population to themselves turf out the insurgents. This is accomplished by tasking troops to protect the population and separate the insurgents from them.<br />
 <br />
The reason for this is the enemy can always move but the population cannot. In a conventional battle something that must be defended must first be successfully attacked and then exploited by subsequent manoeuver. But in counterinsurgency there is nothing the insurgent has to defend. When pressed too closely insurgents can just flee the field, go into hiding, and remain in the area to fight another day. </p>
<p>On the other hand, the population, with its farms, livestock, crops, homes, relatives, and businesses must stay put. The result is you cannot defeat an insurgency by simply fighting insurgents, it&#8217;s like endlessly searching for a needle in a haystack, and ending up by destroying it to find the needle. </p>
<p>If you follow this tack, the population becomes alienated, a recruitment base for the insurgents is established, and another cycle of destruction begins. So, the overarching counterinsurgency strategy is to work with the population. This may be accomplished, as it was in Iraq, for example, by first ?surging? the number of troops to a level that allows them to selectively drive out the enemy. They then focus back on the population and help restructure its environment so that the insurgent cannot return when you leave.<br />
 <br />
To prevent the insurgents return also calls for counterintelligence work to search out the stay behind sleeper cells, and the troops? collaboration as partners with the population and its leadership in their communities and where they can see that their security needs are being met. It also requires that bargains and mutual agreements be struck with community leaders in terms of their commitment to help drive out insurgents and defend themselves. </p>
<p>The goal is to persuade the population to defend itself so that the insurgent can no longer find a safe haven, or are able to control or intimidate. That&#8217;s the fundamental activity of counterinsurgency. Insurgents strive to make the population react in ways that are favourable to them, e.g., lend support, sympathize with their cause, and help intimidate the unconvinced. When they are denied such support by the population, however, it becomes extremely difficult for them to advance their aims. That is the reason why it is not just a matter of putting more boots on the ground, it is what the troops do when they get there that matters. And what they must do once they have moved into an area is remain there. </p>
<p>Troops must live with the population, partner with it, help it to defend itself, help it to keep the insurgents out and from coming back, and help it restructure the community&#8217;s environment to ensure the insurgent are kept out of it. There must be no doubt in the minds of the population that the enemy might one day come back.<br />
 <br />
In Afghanistan the NATO/ISAF strategy must be one with the Afghan government and AFNS (Afghan National Security Forces - Army &amp; Police). Together, they must guarantee that they will be able to protect the population so the enemy cannot return. And killing insurgents is one of the best ways of convincing the population that their antagonist is not going to come back. </p>
<p>This cannot be accomplished by a strategy that focusses only on the delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects. It is fundamentally about political manoeuver; demonstrating longevity to the population so that they feel confident to work with their government </p>
<p>Measured against the key elements that constitute a successful COIN strategy it becomes readily apparent that thus far the Canadian Forces in Kandahar have got it right.<br />
 <br />
But, Insurgencies do not end like conventional warfare. The enemy is not defeated on a battlefield. There is no victory parade. Instead the insurgent threat is reduced to a level at which the government can handle it. </p>
<p>Then, and only then, will our troops have successfully accomplished Canada?s mission in Afghanistan and be able to honourably return to their barracks and the welcoming arms of a thankful nation.<br />
-30-</p>
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		<title>By: David</title>
		<link>http://www.poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-18864</link>
		<dc:creator>David</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jan 2008 19:19:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-18864</guid>
		<description>Good analysis.

In many ways Europe has still to recover from the First World War.  There is a large swathe of European opinion that is pacifist and that simply does not understand any of the realities of the world outside their own cosy and sheltered little countries.  There is a failure to appreciate that Europe might be militarily threatened, ever, by anybody.  This pacifism of ignorance is reinforced by a media that plays down the highly unsavoury elements of just about every undesirable regime and terrorist movement whilst simultaneously painting all the actions of the US and Israel as aggressive and unreasonable.  If the US and Israel are the world's two worst states then Europe does not have much to worry about, so this type of reporting feeds the complacency.

I notice that in recent months Putin's divide and conquer policy in Europe has moved from threatening the tiny Estoniana and militarily weak Poland into a series of incidents involving Britain.  These include flying nuclear bombers near British airspace, closing down British cultural institutions in Russia and arresting a British diplomat in St. Petersburg.  Britain is one of the most militarily powerful EU countries, so these actions show just how appalling the situation has become.  When a tyrant starts testing your defences it is time to strengthen them and prepare for the worst.  I just hope that the new French and German administrations have the stomach to break away from appeasement in the face of these blatant provocations.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Good analysis.</p>
<p>In many ways Europe has still to recover from the First World War.  There is a large swathe of European opinion that is pacifist and that simply does not understand any of the realities of the world outside their own cosy and sheltered little countries.  There is a failure to appreciate that Europe might be militarily threatened, ever, by anybody.  This pacifism of ignorance is reinforced by a media that plays down the highly unsavoury elements of just about every undesirable regime and terrorist movement whilst simultaneously painting all the actions of the US and Israel as aggressive and unreasonable.  If the US and Israel are the world&#8217;s two worst states then Europe does not have much to worry about, so this type of reporting feeds the complacency.</p>
<p>I notice that in recent months Putin&#8217;s divide and conquer policy in Europe has moved from threatening the tiny Estoniana and militarily weak Poland into a series of incidents involving Britain.  These include flying nuclear bombers near British airspace, closing down British cultural institutions in Russia and arresting a British diplomat in St. Petersburg.  Britain is one of the most militarily powerful EU countries, so these actions show just how appalling the situation has become.  When a tyrant starts testing your defences it is time to strengthen them and prepare for the worst.  I just hope that the new French and German administrations have the stomach to break away from appeasement in the face of these blatant provocations.</p>
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		<title>By: Independent Liberal &#187; Couple of Must Reads</title>
		<link>http://www.poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-18862</link>
		<dc:creator>Independent Liberal &#187; Couple of Must Reads</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 22 Jan 2008 19:00:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://poligazette.com/2008/01/22/contemplating-a-post-nato-world/#comment-18862</guid>
		<description>[...] hard to add anything to Michael&#8217;s analysis&#8211;and uniquely European perspective&#8211;on the (declining?) role of NATO.  The crux of this [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] hard to add anything to Michael&#8217;s analysis&#8211;and uniquely European perspective&#8211;on the (declining?) role of NATO.  The crux of this [...]</p>
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