Blowback in Pakistan
The New York Times reports that, according to two former senior intelligence officials, “Pakistan’s premier military intelligence agency has lost control of some of the networks of Pakistani militants it has nurtured since the 1980s, and is now suffering the violent blowback of that policy.”
Although the intelligence service and militants worked together once, the latter have turned against the former after Pervez Musharraf gave the order to crack down on Islamists in his country. “Joining with other extremist groups, they have battled Pakistani security forces and helped militants carry out a record number of suicide attacks last year, including some aimed directly at army and intelligence units as well as prominent political figures, possibly even Benazir Bhutto,” the Times adds.
Obviously, “[t]he growing strength of the militants, many of whom now express support for Al Qaeda’s global jihad, presents a grave threat to Pakistan’s security, as well as NATO efforts to push back the Taliban in Afghanistan.”
It’s quite an in-depth article, with use of sources who know what they’re talking about. The main subject is the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI and the influence of this intelligence agency. Do they sympathize with Musharraf and do they carry out whatever he orders, or do some agents have an agenda of their own and do they sympathize with Islamists?
The article makes it clear that at least some sympathize with Al Qaeda, the Taliban et al. and that this makes it difficult if not impossible for Musharraf to remove the threat these organizations pose to the stability in his own country, in the region and to his regime.
Not only that, however, there’s also a more practical problem: as Charlie explains at Abu Muqawama, it seems that there are two schools of thoughts in the ISI. Some think that it’s time to crack down on militants while others believe that they will need Muslim extremists once the US withdraws from the region. They’ve functioned as “proxy force[s] to exert pressure on India and Afghanistan,” and may have to do so again, according to this school of thought.
ISI officers who agree with the above are unwilling to crack down on militants simply because they think they’ll need them in coming years.
The conclusion: it’s certainly a tremendous mess. The ISI has lost control over the militants it once used against India. They’re now acting on their own. He who digs a hole for another… etc.
