8 Comments »

1. 1 Michael van der Galiën

   November 24, 2007 @ 12:15 pm CET

   When you look at all those who are trying very hard to turn Annapolis into a failure you would almost hope that Ehud Olmert is right when he says that the mere fact that the conference takes place already turns it into a success and a victory.

   I have to respectfully disagree. There’s nothing good about ‘talking’ for the sake of talking. What’s more, the plans of the Arab world are aimed at containing and then pushing back Israel, has been explained at very places, various books and in various documentaries such as “Farewell Israel.”

   In fact, it actually is only good for the Arabs because they can present themselves to some as the ones willing to talk. Meanwhile, they know that not much comes out of it, mostly because Israel will refuse to commit suicide. So, peace won’t come. Israel wants peace, the Arabs don’t. The Arabs want Justice.

   And Justice, to the Arab countries, means no Israel, and one great Palestine.

   You’re looking at this from the perspective of a Westerner. I think we should also look at it from the perspective of the Arab world.

   Again: Justice is the keyword. And of course their interpretation of Justice.

2. 2 Tom

   November 24, 2007 @ 2:56 pm CET

   When talking about the Camp David Accords it helps to keep in mind the events surrounding that historic agreement.

   It was stimulated by Sadat and his partially successful Yom Kippur War. As I read recently in a book about that conflict (can’t remember the title), Sadat was looking for political leverage rather than territorial gain. The Israelis had been so successful militarily that they had no real desire or need to negotiate. Sadat wanted to show that the Israelis weren’t invincible, and thus drive them to the bargaining table. And in 1973 he managed to do just that, launching a surprise attack across the Sinai and even holding some Israeli territory until the end of the conflict. Sadat’s generals wanted him to pull back the troops to avoid getting cut off, a move that was militarily wise. However, Sadat wanted the war to end with Egyptian troops occupying at least some of the Sinai, which was politically wise. And in the years that followed this conflict there were increasing Egyptian-Israeli contacts, and ultimately a peace deal that lasts to this day.

   Not sure what the modern-day equivalent of the Yom Kippur War would be. But something is needed to shake things up and move the process….

3. 3 Michael van der Galiën

   November 24, 2007 @ 3:08 pm CET

   And in the years that followed this conflict there were increasing Egyptian-Israeli contacts, and ultimately a peace deal that lasts to this day.

   Not sure what the modern-day equivalent of the Yom Kippur War would be. But something is needed to shake things up and move the process….

   Well, that’s a nice positive interpretation. Peace process? Have you ever took the time to analyze Sadat’s words?

   Did he see it as a lasting peace, or as a different kind of war? A diplomatical one? In other words, was it a peace treaty for Sadat, or was it a temporary agreement, meant to be broken once the Arabs were stronger again?

   And about the YKW: that was one ludicrous war for Israel. You do know, I hope, that Israel was fighting for her very existence? That without the (logistical) support of the US, Israel would’ve lost?

4. 4 Michael van der Galiën

   November 24, 2007 @ 3:33 pm CET

   Let me add: if I remember correctly what I’ve learned about this war, didn’t Meir’s administration inform the US government during the fighting that Israel would be lost if the US didn’t help out quickly?

5. 5 Tom

   November 24, 2007 @ 4:18 pm CET

   Israel was indeed at risk, but from the Syrians not the Egyptians. The former came dangerously close to breaking through Israeli lines, the latter just managed to capture a few miles of the Sinai, which really was their primary goal.

   Don’t know if the peace was intended to be temporary or permanent. I do know that there haven’t been any Egyptian-Israeli conflicts since the Camp David accords. Nor have I heard of any new military tensions.

6. 6 rudi666

   November 24, 2007 @ 6:43 pm CET

   Since the talks with Egypt and Jordan how many wars has Israel fought with those countries(ZERO)? This just shows that the Nixon/Kissinger “realpolitik wing” is a complete failure.

   What I find interesting is the new verb in Israelis circles - “lecondel”.

   http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/11/africa/mideast.php

   Israel, for its part, wants to be as vague as possible about borders and land swaps, because it is occupied land to trade that is Israel’s main bargaining chip. On the other hand, Olmert wants to be as specific as possible about the refugee issue. He and his deputy, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, vow that no Palestinian refugee will return to what is now Israel, and that the new Palestine will be the homeland for Palestinians.

   So Olmert is reluctant even to countenance the possibility of humanitarian exceptions, as the Clinton administration did at Camp David. He is also insistent that the Palestinians recognize Israel “as a Jewish state,” another way of trying to shut the door on refugees.

   As Olmert’s coalition partners warn him against going too far, Palestinian negotiators have had semi-public spats over status and content, especially on the demand, rejected by Israel, that a firm deadline be established for the creation of a Palestinian state.

   The long build-up to Annapolis, together with Rice’s many trips to the region, have given birth to a new verb in Israeli government circles: “lecondel,” based on Rice’s first name. People say that they don’t have time to “lecondel,” - meaning, to come and go for meetings that produce few results.

   Still, a weak Olmert, beset by a failed war in Lebanon and numerous criminal investigations, is committed to try, needing a peace agenda to help justify his term in office. He understands, senior Israeli officials say, that moderate partners like Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who believe in nonviolence and two states, may not come again.
   

7. 7 Jason Steck

   November 24, 2007 @ 7:07 pm CET

   As a professor of international relations, I do not understand how incidents of successful negotiations after a series of wars shows “realpolitik” to be a “complete failure”. In 1967 and 1973, Israel met power with greater power, won, and was able then to negotiate a permanent peace on favorable terms — none of this is intrinsically in conflict with the predictions of realist theory upon which “realpolitik” is based.

   While I might agree that liberal theory provides a better account of the peace/war dynamic in the Middle East (and perhaps constructivism an even better account), I think it a serious overreach to jump straight from Camp David to a complete dismissal of the entire realist paradigm.

   It might be worth noting that “realpolitik” and “neoconservativism” are near polar opposites in foreign policy, as even the leftist foreign policy critic James Carroll points out in House of War. Conflating and condemning Nixon/Kissinger/Rice because of a perceived association with Kristol/Cheney/Rumsfeld would be a seriously misleading category mistake. As I have pointed out many times, “neoconservatives” are really Wilsonian liberals with a bizarre and theoretically incoherent militarist edge kludged on. And it is worth remembering that realist scholars almost unanimously condemned the U.S. decision to embrace war in regards to Iraq.

8. 8 rudi666

   November 25, 2007 @ 5:13 am CET

   JS - This line was meant as sarcasm.

   This just shows that the Nixon/Kissinger “realpolitik wing” is a complete failure.

   While I have problems with their “peace with honor” in Vietnam, the foreign policy results(China & USSR) were HISTORIC. By the US talking to both we made both wary of each other and hepled to break the two Communist apart.

RSS feed for comments on this post. TrackBack URL

Leave a comment

PoliGazette Comments Policy

PoliGazette encourages comments from all viewpoints, especially those that disagree. Comments submitted must, however, adhere to the following standards. Comments that violate these standards may be edited or deleted without notice at the sole discretion of the editors. Commenters who repeatedly or egregiously violate these standards or who attempt to argue publicly with editors regarding the comments policy may be banned from commenting further.

(1) Comments should address the substantive content of the post. Comments that repeatedly or blatantly misrepresent the content of the post or of others' comments are not welcome. Comments that respond to something other than which the contributor or commenter may have said are irrelevant and should not be posted.

(2) Comments should avoid vulgarity as well as racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual bigotry.

(3) Comments should not personally attack the character, personal integrity, or professional reputation of any PoliGazette contributor or of other commenters.

(4) Comments should reflect the contributions of the commenters themselves and should not include extensive cut-and-paste reproductions of others' words except insofar as necessary to supplement the commenter's own arguments. Link spam, trackback spam, and propaganda spam will be instantly deleted.

(5) Public figures are considered open to all substantive criticism of their policies and statements. Comments that present objectively false factual information about public figures (i.e. "Obama is a Muslim") or that attack public figures by attacking their families are not welcome. Comments that merely repeat slogans for or against a candidate without engaging in substantive comment are not welcome.

Questions or challenges to these policies or their application should be directed to the editors by email only.