World War IV as seen by Norman Podhoretz
Filed under: Neoconservatives — Pieter Dorsman on October 9, 2007 @ 6:33 pm CEST
Over the weekend I read Norman Podhoretz’ World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism and it was a riveting read, despite the fact that it did not really provide any guidance as to the actual struggle itself. Podhoretz provides an inventory of what has happened in the US since 9/11 by focusing on how the Bush Doctrine has fared and by comparing it to foreign policy strategies that guided US foreign policy during previous global conflicts.
The book starts by explaining how we can not understand the struggle in front us unless we see it for what it is, another World War and by allocating the number ‘III’ to the Cold War it follows that we’re now in World War IV. The fact that very few have internalized this notion makes it clear why the Bush Doctrine (repudiation of moral relativism, acknowledging the non-economic origins of terrorism, the right to pre-emptive action and the creation of a Palestinian State) has run into so much opposition at home and abroad. What follows is a well structured overview of those who have resisted Bush’s policies or who have broken ranks with president in the past five years: the Europeans, the mainstream media, the isolationists on the right (Buchanan) and on the left (Chomsky), the liberal internationalists (Kupchan, Ikenberry), the realists (Brzezinski, Scowcroft), the Democrats, Conservatives (George Will, W.F. Buckley) and finally some of Podhoretz’ own partners, neocons such as Fukuyama who have now distanced themselves from Bush. Once you have digested the various chapters dealing with these dissenters it becomes clear why the White House today is such a lonely place to be. But it also introduces a measure of respect for the doctrine and some sympathy for the man who launched it and that is what Podhoretz is essentially driving at: resurrecting George W. Bush.
A number of arguments are offered in support. For one, progress in Iraq is still underreported and if you add in the successes in Afghanistan, the elections in Lebanon and a neutralized Libya than the overall record is more than a little impressive. But more importantly it is unlikely that given the current constellation of international politics his successor in the White House can comfortably steer events back to a post 9/11 world and the Bush Doctrine will consequently survive a transition of power. In that Podhoretz emphasizes how the Truman Doctrine was embraced by Eisenhower in 1953 after a campaign during which the Republicans campaigned against it aggressively. Now it may be easy to debunk this comparison with a series of arguments, but Podhoretz is right in suggesting that a centrist Democrat may well embrace the Bush Doctrine in parts or in its entirety and rebrand it as a post 9/11 and post-Bush compass in the struggle against Islamist excesses. Its highly unrewarding introduction and initial failures will, at least in the short run, be associated with its originator.
So the book offers some compelling argument to reassess Bush, yet there are some weaknesses. In order to make his argument and to build the case for Bush’s successful presidency, Podhoretz is more than willing to gloss over the negatives that have materialized during the opening stages of World War IV. He glosses over torture and the excesses of an enhanced and emboldened domestic security apparatus as necessary parts of waging the war on terror, hardly worth elaborating on. That is an odd stance for someone who likes us to believe that he really is the one of the few remaining foreign policy thinkers whose investment in freedom and liberty is underpinned by a deep morality. Likewise, very little time is spent on the domestic troubles that have plagued Bush leading Podhoretz to argue that very few presidents have entered the pantheon of greatness on their domestic record: he considers accomplishments in the foreign arena as the sole entry ticket. But the incompetence and nepotism that is now associated with Bush has no doubt impacted negatively on the willingness to accept the basic tenets of the Bush Doctrine. Worse, many defenders of Bush have abandoned both the man and the doctrine precisely because of the perception of recklessness and incompetence that has come to be associated with this administration.
Yet once you have read this book and seen the instructive video that accompanies it, the reader is left with some blocks with which the Bush presidency can be rebuilt as one of change and potential long-term success. The latter as Podhoretz argues will take decades, but if the struggle against Islamofascism indeed is based on pro-actively engaging and redesigning the Middle East, then credit is to be given to George W. Bush.
Finally, Podhoretz has a few words for those – like myself – who have made a now familiar sounding complaint about the failure of the Bush Doctrine to get real traction in America and other free nations (page 205):
Finally, I believe that future historians will be mystified by the endlessly repeated complaint from conservatives today that Bush has failed to explain what this war is all about and what it will take to win it. For it will seem obvious in retrospect (my italics, ed.) that he has done precisely that in a series of speeches among which are some of the greatest ever made by an American president.
World War IV will take decades and it will take equally long or maybe even longer to address all the questions that it has generated from the day it started. In the meantime, Podhoretz’ book is a good start to bring some structure to the quest for answers.
1 mikkel
October 9, 2007 @ 5:07 pm CESTAll I have to say is the expression “If someone has a problem with you, it’s probably them. If everyone has a problem with you, it’s probably you.”
2 Michael van der Galiën
October 9, 2007 @ 5:21 pm CESTThat sounds like a fascinating book Pieter, with a refreshing look on Bush’s foreign policy.
I’m one of those people who supported the Bush doctrine at the start, but believe that Bush is - indeed - quite incompetent, but this sounds like a book that could give some perspective. Perhaps.
3 Michael van der Galiën
October 9, 2007 @ 5:24 pm CESTOne thing though: I often think that Podhoretz et. al don’t truly understand Arab and Muslim culture. That may sound strange - they’re experts after all - but I often get the idea they understand their subject intellectually, but not emotionally.
4 Xel
October 9, 2007 @ 10:18 pm CEST“But it also introduces a measure of respect for the doctrine and some sympathy for the man who launched it and that is what Podhoretz is essentially driving at: resurrecting George W. Bush.”
The discrepancy between the importance and respectability of the given rationale and the actions committed in the rationale’s name is unfathomable.
There can be no measure of respect for either the Pres or anything committed in the *name* of ethics and humanity only. What kind of conservative goes swooning over potential and then tries to cover the pathetic actuality with the mother of pearl gloss of the potentiality? Tries to excuse reckless spending and careless promises, deception of the public, dogmatist barking, grand plans, shoddy logistical preparation, propaganda, monitoring and gulags, outright lies and lord knows what other “stalinism-exclusive” sins with the *promise of light at the end of the tunnel*? Neo-conservatives are not conservatives, period.
5 Chris
October 10, 2007 @ 3:50 am CESTOh Norman Podhoretz. The godfather of neoconservatism.
This man is not to be taken seriously. His own writing and quotes paint a picture of a madman bent on war:
Glenn Greenwald dug up this old paper (1963) from Norm that might explain his eagerness to play the role of a warrior:
I hope and pray our leaders stop listening to Norman Podhoretz.
6 Ken Hoop
October 10, 2007 @ 3:59 am CESTEveryone knows Podhoretz’s prime motivation is the
protection of Israel, where paranoids like him believe they might have to eventually flee. Of course, dual loyalism’s
consequences increase,not decrease that otherwise
far-fetched scenario.
7 Kevin Sullivan
October 10, 2007 @ 5:28 am CESTIt’s the Hoop!
8 Libya » Blog Archives » World War IV as seen by Norman Podhoretz « The Van Der Galiën Gazette
October 10, 2007 @ 7:28 am CEST[…] World War IV as seen by Norman Podhoretz
9 Snorri Godhi
October 11, 2007 @ 6:52 pm CEST“…it will seem obvious in retrospect that he has done precisely that…” (i.e. he has explained what the war is about and what it will take to win it).
That may well be, but what good is an explanation that will be obvious only “in retrospect”?
10 Trendonyms.com
October 12, 2007 @ 7:17 am CESTi would like to see more of the videos and the pics !
11 SS
December 1, 2007 @ 11:43 am CETPieter,
I find your blogs very interesting. But this one in particular and the comments following it, has prompted me to make a post.
I haven’t read the book so I won’t make a judgment about it. But I am interested in initiating a side-topic around the ‘Bush doctrine’. I am hoping that your reader’s perspectives may help me understand the issues surrounding it better and may even generate some creative solutions.
I will kick off the conversation by asking a few rhetorical questions about the ‘Bush doctrine’:
1. Was the doctrine right in the first place? If so, how?
2. Did the doctrine fail or succeed? If it has failed, how did it fail? If it did succeed, how did it succeed?
3. Why are we in a mess today?
4. What can we do to solve this pervasive predicament?
As a conversation starter I will take a first stab by staking my position on these questions:
1. Was the doctrine right in the first place? If so, how?
If its grand purpose was to reconcile the difference in a ‘Flat World’, then it was definitely right. At the very least, it was timely.
2. Did the doctrine fail or succeed?
It has succeeded and it has failed. It has succeeded by initiating an intense global dialogue on several fronts. Its greatest failing was its inability to frame its purpose (and in on may occasions, its willingness to distort purpose when deemed necessary!).
3. Why are we in a quagmire today?
Our refusal to frame the issue is the prime reason why we are in this quagmire… but… its not an easy problem.
In my mind, we have several issues to reconcile:
• The conflict between the ‘west way’ and the ‘eastern way’.
• The teenage angst & inner turmoil, of Islam, compounded by its conflict against its older siblings.
• The conflict against capitalism, that seeks to widen the gap between the privileged citizens of the developed world and the impoverished people of war-ravaged, disease-ridden segments of the third-world.
• The conflict against an ‘imperfect’ democracy that seeks to impose itself on other ‘imperfect’ systems of government…
..these are the issues of our time.
‘World War 4’ is not a political war. It’s a war of ideologies. What makes it hard to solves is the fact that it’s a conflict of ideologies on several dimensions. Which is why it’s the first of its kind; and we do not know how to deal with it…. Therein lies the problem.
4. What can we do to solve this pervasive predicament?
I think we can resolve this ‘conflict of ideologies’ only through a global dialogue. But we are not ready for it yet… Islam has to come to the table.
…But to do that, we have to first help Islam untangle the dilemma it is already in. It has an identity crisis and it’s been hijacked. And we can’t intervene or fix it… but we can definitely guide it. How? I am not sure. (That is a question I ask the reader.)
But I feel that this is where we have to start making some positive change…. Because, I feel Islam deserves our compassion, not our criticism.
Recommended Reading:
http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/January%202005/January2005RabilPFV.html