As soon as I finished reading Mearsheimer’s and Walt’s The Israel Lobby, I realized I had far too much to say to put it all into a single post. In view of the large number of arguable assertions in the book, it’s far easier — for me and my readers — to deal with them one at a time. In this first installment of my review, the focus is on the authors’ contentions regarding the mainstream media’s coverage of Israel.

Here’s what Mearsheimer and Walt (M&W) contend:

A key part of preserving positive public attitudes toward Israel is to ensure that the mainstream media’s coverage of Israel and the Middle East consistently favors Israel and does not call U.S. support into question in any way. While serious criticism of Israel occasionally reaches a large audience across the United States, the American media’s coverage of Israel tends to be strongly biased in Israel’s favor, especially when compared with news coverage in other democracies.

M&W treat the New York Times less harshly than other representatives of the mainstream media:

To its credit, the New York Times’s editorials sometimes criticize Israeli policies, and in recent years, the criticism has occasionally been strongly worded. The Times recognizes that the Palestinians have legitimate grievances and a right to have their own state. Still, its treatment of the two sides over the years has not been evenhanded.

Have the Time’s editorials been less than evenhanded? Is it only in recent years that it has issued “strongly-worded” criticisms? To find out, I consulted the newspaper’s archives, starting with 1987 — the year the first intifada began. As an old PoliSci major, I remember a thing or two about content analysis.

The results of my study show — conclusively, in my view — that the Times editorial stance has been evenhanded. Many of its editorials have been critical of Israel, and not just in recent years. That M&W’s characterization is so far off the mark obviously reduces the credibility of their other assertions. But that’s the topic of the next installment of my review of their book.

The remainder of this post consists of extended excerpts from Times editorials. I’ve purposely used extended excerpts so that I can avoid being accused of quoting out of context. M&W would have been better served had they done the same.

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The first intifada began on December 8, 1987. This is an excerpt from an editorial on the Palestinian revolt published on Christmas Day:

Washington points in one right direction when it complains about Israel’s use of lethal, live ammunition for crowd control purposes. Israel’s Defense Forces, armed with automatic weapons and under orders to shoot to kill, have been called to confront a problem more political than military . . . An alert Israeli Government could take other constructive steps without sacrificing longer-term diplomatic and security goals. For example, it could order a freeze or rollback of the highly provocative settlements established by some 2,500 ultra-religious Jews in the densely populated Gaza Strip . . . The Israeli Government could also challenge Trade Minister Ariel Sharon’s flagrantly provocative move into an apartment in Arab East Jerusalem. (December 25, 1987)

In March 1988, “[p]andering to Israel’s supposed interests,” Congress ordered the Justice Department to shut down the PLO’s observer mission at the UN. This move, said the Times, “showed contempt for international law and American ideals of free speech.” Further,

Only Congress can recover America’s reputation, by repealing this law and repudiating its own demagoguery. Some of Israel’s best friends are deeply divided on the issue of the observer mission. But politicians like Jack Kemp, Bob Dole and Paul Simon - to mention some of those who are running for President - have truckled to the most passionate and least reasonable of Israel’s supporters . . . Is there anyone in Congress willing to stand up for these foreign policy considerations and basic American principles and who will fight to repeal this foolish and self-defeating law? (March 3, 1988)

In another editorial on the intifada, the Times took Prime Minister Shamir and Secretary of State Shultz to task:

Inexcusably, Prime Minister Shamir says that Palestinian rioters will be crushed ”like grasshoppers.” Does this man, a leader of Jews who were trampled on for centuries because they were Jews, believe that human beings are insects? . . . Arab leaders will also know when an Israeli government seeks peace. It will be, it can be, only when Israel clearly accepts the principle of negotiations based on trading land for peace . . . Secretary of State George Shultz is trying, in bewildering fashion, to help bridge the chasm. He wanders around the Middle East every few weeks trying to create the basis for negotiations. If that’s even possible under present political conditions, it would tax the abilities of a full-time American emissary. Does Mr. Shultz, a man of realism and accomplishment, think that his episodic journeys will produce serious negotiations? (April 10, 1988)

As the 1988 presidential campaign heated up, the Times took note of disagreements between the candidates and Prime Minister Shamir:

Predictably, Vice President Bush, Governor Dukakis, Senator Gore and Mr. Jackson try to outdo each other in proclaiming their strong support for Israel. But surprisingly, they show themselves to varying degrees to be at odds with Prime Minister Shamir on two central negotiating issues:

All are prepared to deal with the Palestine Liberation Organization provided it renounces terrorism and unequivocally accepts the existence of the Jewish state of Israel. Mr. Shamir and his Likud colleagues say they’ll refuse to talk with the P.L.O. under any circumstance.

All the candidates agree that any resolution must be based on the principle of trading land for peace. Mr. Shamir resists any diminution of Israel’s control of the West Bank. (April 17, 1988)

Commenting on the results of the 1988 Israeli elections, the Times said the “demands by pivotal religious parties to enforce Orthodox rules of who is a Jew and what can be done on the Sabbath” were “troubling,” and “[b]y agreeing to these in order to form a coalition government, Likud leaders would further undermine Israeli unity and ignite unease among Jews elsewhere.”

Most likely the Likud will establish a ruling majority flatly opposed to any negotiation over trading land for peace, and determined to crush the Palestinian resistance and increase Israeli settlement on the West Bank . . . if Mr. Shamir, who will most likely remain Prime Minister, responds to the continued uprising with full and vengeful force and no hope, he risks tearing his divided nation apart - Arab from Jew and Jew from Jew. (November 3, 1988)

Nine days later, the Times averred that

. . . the uprising in the West Bank and Gaza continues to make evident the moral cost of indefinite occupation. The other day, Israeli soldiers killed a 3-year-old boy while shooting at stone-throwers whose ages were 12 and 13. (November 12, 1988)

A week before the U.S. announced that — in a reversal of its previous policy — it would engage in direct contacts with the PLO, the Times had been critical of the old stance:

. . . refusing to listen to Yasir Arafat, or barring him from speaking in New York, is a sterile policy as long as the P.L.O. chairman is backed by most of his own people and most Arab states. (December 8, 1988)

This was followed by an editorial stating that

Yasir Arafat now has said enough, barely, to justify the Reagan Administration’s decision to begin talks with the P.L.O. The U.S. now has the necessary grounds, barely, to explore the tortuous negotiating trail ahead. (December 16, 1988)

A few days later, the Times was sharply critical of Israel:

The world has turned, but not Israel’s leadership. The Middle East rings with news of America’s momentous decision to talk with the Palestine Liberation Organization, yet Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir responds with a reshuffled coalition government, this time expressly opposed to any contacts with the P.L.O. By contenting themselves with merely hanging tough, Israel’s major parties retreat from the new realities . . . Yitzhak Rabin, a Labor hard-liner, stays on as Defense Minister, suggesting a continued tilt toward repression in the occupied territories. Labor also abandoned its opposition to new settlements on the West Bank . . . It is hard to reconcile this pragmatic surrender with Mr. Peres’s contention that Israel remains receptive to the views of Palestinians in the territories . . . What is more disturbing than any of these particulars is the unwillingness of Israeli politicians to heed the seismic shift of attitude elsewhere, especially the United States. As the P.L.O. advances fitfully toward a serious negotiating position, Israeli leaders retreat. (12/21/88)

In January 1989, the Times addressed the possibility of a hardening of U.S.-Israeli relations:

For all his double-talk, Yasir Arafat has done enough in recent weeks - including apparently halting terror operations - to put the burden of the next move on Israel. That’s clearly the private sentiment among many people in Congress and incoming Bush administration officials. American perceptions about Arab-Israeli relations are in flux. Reports that Israel is taking tougher measures to quell the Palestinian uprising stir this pot. There’s no danger that the U.S. Government will turn anti-Israel; it’s that opinion could become less, even far less, pro-Israel. With so much at stake, Mr. Shamir & Company simply cannot afford to allow matters to drift, permitting the impression to grow that Israel opposes a serious exploration of peace . . . A New York Times/CBS News Poll shows that two-thirds of the American public favors U.S. talks with the P.L.O. That’s true even though many respondents doubt the peaceful intentions of either Israel or the P.L.O. These results reflect and reinforce official opinion. If Israel has sound ideas to test the chances for peace, the time to present them is now. (January 19, 1989)

In May 1989, the Times endorsed a speech given by Secretary of State Baker:

He jolted the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, this country’s principal pro-Israel lobby, with a call for Israel to ”lay aside, once and for all, the unrealistic vision of a greater Israel” including the West Bank and Gaza Strip. And he urged the Palestinians to ”reach out to Israelis and convince them of your peaceful intentions.” . . . Among other actions, he wants Israel to reopen the Palestinian schools and to stop further settlements inside the occupied territories.(May 24, 1989)

Another condemnation of the Israeli government, this time for making the Middle East “quiver”:

By capitulating to the right wing of his Likud Party, Prime Minister Shamir of Israel has made the Middle East quiver. Likud’s new hard-line position on talks with Palestinians could unhinge the coalition Government with Labor, ignite even more Arab violence in the occupied territories, spark confrontation with the United States and block the direct Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that seemed so likely only days ago. Perhaps Mr. Shamir didn’t have the votes to beat Ariel Sharon and his cohorts. If so, that’s a melancholy sign of the power that Israeli political extremists now wield. (July 7, 1989)

This was followed by a criticism of Shamir’s peace plan:

The Shamir plan is very general. In the first stage, Palestinians in the occupied territories would step forward and bargain with Israel over the terms for holding elections. Those elected would then negotiate with Israel a form of qualified autonomy in the territories. After an interim period, this Palestinian entity and Israel would work out ”a permanent agreement.” There’s no role in this process for the P.L.O., and that organization refuses any arrangement that doesn’t guarantee it some form of direct participation. Nor will the P.L.O. start a bargaining process without a prior commitment to Palestinian statehood, something Israel flatly opposes. (August 17, 1989)

The following month, the Times called for greater U.S. engagement in the peace process:

. . . the Bush Administration has been letting the situation percolate . . . do [Secretary Baker] and President Bush realize that little can be accomplished in the Middle East unless the United States begins to put its prestige and power on the line? To play a constructive role, the Administration has to deliver two messages loud and clear. One is to the Palestine Liberation Organization: Accept the Israeli plan for election as a basis for talks, for there is no negotiating alternative. The other is to Israel: If appropriate Palestinian negotiators appear, agree to begin talks, for there is no better way to demonstrate who wants peace and who does not. (September 25, 1989)

Another fusillade aimed at the Israeli government:

The Likud leadership never seems to run out of ways to avoid talks with Palestinians. Last week’s split decision by the Israeli Cabinet to reject an Egyptian initiative for getting such talks under way is the latest example of this ingenuity. Likud’s intransigence must surely please Arab and Israeli hard-liners. But the endless delays in discussing Israel’s own plan for holding elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip cannot serve Israel’s long-term interests. The Likud position is an affront to President Mubarak of Egypt, whose attitude toward Israel is pivotal among moderate Arabs. It undercuts Palestinians who have taken risks to urge talks with Israel. And it certainly doesn’t help Israel’s standing in the United States . . . Mr. Shamir is surely playing for time. At heart he doesn’t want negotiations with the Palestinians - even based on his own plan, if the outcome might ultimately lead to a Palestinian homeland. He wants to demonstrate that the Palestinian uprising is now under control and thereby remove that bargaining time bomb. (October 10, 1989)

As the new decade began, the Times accused Israel of poisoning the atmosphere:

Israeli police threw Faisal al-Husseini, a prominent West Bank Palestinian, into jail for a weekend. Prime Minister Shamir seemed to say that the flood of new Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union be settled in the West Bank. Ariel Sharon and other Likud extremists insist that Mr. Shamir abandon his proposal for elections in the occupied territories . . . If Mr. Shamir wants to retain any credibility among Israeli and American moderates, he will have to drop two demands. First, he cannot insist that the P.L.O. have no role at all in choosing the Palestinian delegation. Specifically, he’ll have to accept as delegates people who live in East Jerusalem and Palestinians who have been deported from the occupied territories for political reasons as distinguished from those exiled for terrorism. Second, Mr. Shamir cannot reasonably deny the Palestinian delegation the right to discuss final status during the initial talks on elections. (January 25, 1990)

In March 1990, the Times took note of an important change is U.S. policy vis-a-vis Israel:

President Bush made the maneuvering all the more complicated last week. He said, for the first time, that he opposed Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem as well as the occupied territories . . . The remark seemed to hint a change in Administration thinking about what kind of Israeli government could best pursue negotiations . . . Until now, the Administration has argued that a Likud-led coalition with Labor was the preferable way. Now the U.S. seems so frustrated with Mr. Shamir that it might prefer a Labor-led government . . . Mr. Bush and Mr. Baker need not be still in stressing that Israel, led by whichever government, belongs at the table, with appropriate Palestinians, as quickly as possible. (March 15, 1990)

Three months later, the Times again underlined its and the Bush administration’s displeasure with the policies of the Israeli government:

. . . the Administration also has run out of patience with Yitzhak Shamir, and with good reason. More than a year ago, the Israeli Prime Minister presented a plan for talks with Palestinians that would lead to elections and limited self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Then he and his Likud bloc raised one obstacle after another and the process collapsed. So did his coalition Government with the Labor party. He made matters worse by establishing new Israeli settlements in these occupied territories . . . [Shamir] leaves the impression of favoring a policy that would truly invite disaster: that many of these immigrants would be helped to settle in the occupied territories. For Israel to do that would provoke already embittered Palestinians and accelerate the erosion of support for Israel in the United States and elsewhere. To bolster that support, to unify his own country and to further peace, Mr. Shamir would be wise to put his Government back on the track toward negotiations with Palestinians. And the critical first step is to stop subsidizing all Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Such a step would create monumental difficulties for Mr. Shamir, but would be ennobling. In the autumn of his career, does he wish no finer accolade than agile? Does he not dream of leading - beyond a tissue-thin coalition - a peaceful country? Israel’s security cannot indefinitely be limited to being tough on Palestinians; it has to involve trying negotiations. (June 13, 1990)

Next, the Times linked progress in the on-going negotiations between Israel and Syria with progress in the Israel-PLO negotiations:

Washington needs to persuade the Israeli Government that talks with Damascus won’t get anywhere unless there’s progress on the Palestinian problem. Mr. Shamir might try to sidetrack talks with Palestinians by diverting his diplomatic efforts to improving relations with Syria. And Mr. Assad might be only too eager to play along, given his blood feud with Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization. But in the long run, Mr. Assad must tend to Palestinian concerns before he can clasp hands with Israel. (July 18, 1990)

Following an incident during which 21 Palestinians were killed and more than 100 wounded when Israeli police fired into a crowd on the Temple Mount (an incident that took place after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), the Times asked:

In what conceivable way can it be in the interest of Israel, America or the global coalition against Iraq for the Israeli Government to persist in its petulant bluster about the killings on the Temple Mount? Let us put the incident behind us, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir now tells President Bush. Yet it is his own Government that keeps attention fastened on the tragedy . . . [Shamir] continues to insist that the incident was a provocation planned by the Palestine Liberation Organization - as though that would justify shooting at unarmed civilians. Worse, by refusing to cooperate with a United Nations inquiry, his Cabinet members act as though they were the victims. And still worse, Ariel Sharon, now the Housing Minister, is occupied with how to tell the United States where to get off. Israel has assured the U.S. that it would not settle Soviet emigres in East Jerusalem? Yes, but so what: he and a Cabinet committee now propose to install them there by the thousands. (October 18, 1990)

In February 1991, the Times accused Israel of promoting a “spy scare”:

Under cover of a genuine war scare in Israel, Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s right-wing coalition is promoting a spy scare that smells. Sari Nusseibeh, a prominent West Bank Palestinian, was arrested Tuesday for allegedly informing Iraqi targeters where Scud missiles had landed — a grave charge if true. Mr. Nusseibeh, who denies doing any such thing, was given a six-month sentence without any trial or formal charges. That looks less like justice than a vendetta . . . Why no trial? Security considerations alone cannot explain or justify not holding one. And it would certainly suit the political interests of Mr. Shamir’s right-wing allies for there to be a trial in which moderates like Mr. Nusseibeh could, if guilty, be publicly discredited. The lack of a trial invites the disquieting suspicion that the Government chose not to try Mr. Nusseibeh because it has, at best, flimsy evidence. It’s hard enough to discuss territorial compromise between Israelis and Palestinians when Scuds are flying overhead and Palestinians remain under 24-hour curfew. But when moderates like Mr. Nusseibeh are jailed as spies, then there’s nobody to talk to. That too, of course, would perfectly suit Israeli hard-liners. (February 1, 1991)

After a promising start following Clinton’s election and Yitzhak Rabin becoming Israel’s Prime Minister, the Times expressed some reservations:

. . . will Mr. Rabin, elected last June on a platform of speeding up the talks, now begin to deliver on that promise? He has so far managed mainly to disappoint Israeli doves and back Palestinian moderates into a corner by his harsh security measures. (April 26, 1993)

Reacting to the massacre of Muslims in Hebron by a fundamentalist Jew, the Times didn’t mince its words:

The unspeakable atrocity in Hebron yesterday morning — in which more than 40 Muslims were gunned down while they prayed at a sacred mosque — appears to have been the work of a deranged and fanatical individual. But Palestinian leaders are absolutely right to require decisive governmental action to prevent such outrages in the future. That action can and must come not from the United Nations, as the Palestinians ask, but directly from the Israeli Government . . . Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin’s first response to the most deadly massacre in the history of Israeli occupation of the West Bank consisted of sympathetic words, but inadequate actions. (February 26, 1994)

After a series of terrorist attacks by Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups, the Times offered this advice:

Eradicating terrorism will take a long time and it is an illusion to think that even the best police work can completely guarantee public safety. Israel must therefore keep doing all it can to dry up the sea of sympathizers in which these killers swim by responding to the legitimate political claims of the Palestinian population and continuing to negotiate peace agreements with neighboring Arab states. Hawks in Israel are already blaming Mr. Rabin’s peace diplomacy for Wednesday’s attack. Some of these Israelis seek to discredit a peace process they do not like. (October 21, 1994)

An editorial in praise of Arafat:

Yasir Arafat as tough-minded political boss cracking down on Palestinian terrorists seems an incongruous image, but that roughly describes the latest step in his shift from Israel’s enemy to its partner in peace. The chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization is now embarked on the administration of Gaza and Jericho, and he has made progress in establishing civil authority . . . Mr. Arafat has also become a far more credible negotiating partner with Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin. Mr. Arafat’s firmer governance is largely responsible for the recent progress toward extending Palestinian rule to major cities of the West Bank. As autonomy is expanded in the next months, the P.L.O.’s credit should further improve. These gains have given Mr. Arafat the political strength to take on Islamic militants of Hamas and other organizations that preach and practice violence. Attacks on Israelis have sharply declined, although spectacular new suicide bombings are always possible . . . In the long run, rule of law is the best guarantee of security in the Palestinian areas. Mr. Arafat has not yet established a fully operational administration. He fails to delegate authority, cannot account for development aid and stifles a critical press. But on one of the most important prerequisites to the future of Palestinian autonomy, security, Yasir Arafat has done more than many predicted. For that he deserves credit. (July 15, 1995)

Another editorial in a similar vein:

Israel’s Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the P.L.O.’s chairman, Yasir Arafat, are now more resolved than ever to carry through the Oslo peace accords. It is particularly encouraging that Mr. Arafat has finally shown himself determined to wage war against any Palestinians who would resort to violence to block further progress. (July 27, 1995)

The following month, the Times editorialized on “peace, terror and dissent” in Israel:

It is hard to see, though, how a return to indefinite occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, as Likud seems to want, will miraculously stop Hamas terrorism or somehow lead to a lasting peace . . . While Likud is certainly entitled to argue for terminating talks, its arguments ring hollow as long as it offers no realistic alternative for halting terror or achieving peace with the Palestinians. (August 23, 1995)

Less than a month later, the Times took dead aim at the West Bank settlers:

Militant Jewish settlers in the West Bank have been among the most irreconcilable opponents of Israel’s peace agreements with the Palestine Liberation Organization. As citizens of a democratic country, that is their right. But last weekend, two gangs of settler militants took their opposition to the point of criminal violence . . . Settler violence, like its more deadly Palestinian counterpart, cannot be allowed to destroy the promise of peace . . . the latest surge in settler violence coincides with progress toward an agreement that would, for the first time, extend Palestinian autonomy to the major cities of the West Bank . . . the Rabin Government has a reliable parliamentary majority and remains committed to uphold the agreements it signed with the P.L.O. But the Government has also pledged to Israeli voters that no Jewish settlers will be forced to relocate during the present phase of autonomy. Keeping faith with both of those pledges has led to considerable complications . . . The Rabin Government has been willing to put the whole peace process at risk for the sake of the Hebron settlers. In return, some of these settlers have engaged in criminal conduct that no democracy can tolerate. Mr. Rabin is right to insist that the P.L.O. must accommodate itself to the settlers’ legitimate security needs. He is just as right to insist that the settlers respect the rule of law. (September 12, 1995)

The Times’s positive reaction to the January 1996 Palestinian elections:

The voting extended the evolution of the Palestine Liberation Organization from a guerrilla movement to an elected party of government and conferred a mandate of democratic legitimacy on the P.L.O.’s longtime leader, Yasir Arafat . . . Turnout was encouragingly high, even though the Islamic Hamas movement and radical secular groups boycotted the election to protest Mr. Arafat’s compromises with Israel over territory and security arrangements . . . It is fair to say that the elections make the prospect of eventual statehood seem more realistic, a point not lost on militant right-wing Jewish settlers. For the most part these settlers did not follow through on their threats to disrupt the election. A large Israeli military presence may have kept the settlers in line. (January 22, 1996)

Reacting to the terror campaigns of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Times said that the peace process must continue:

The purpose of these terrorist acts is not just to kill people but to destroy the peace agreement. It is a credit to the fortitude of the majority of Israelis and Palestinians that the peace plan remains intact. Talks on the most sensitive issues, including Jerusalem, Jewish settlements and potential Palestinian statehood, scheduled to begin in May, must go forward, pausing only for the current Israeli election campaign. The borders dividing Israel from the West Bank and Gaza, sealed once again after the bombings, should be reopened once passions have calmed, rather than keeping them closed through the end of May as some Israelis now propose. (February 28, 1996)

In another editorial on terrorism, the Times said that Prime Minister Peres

. . . cannot hope to renew the Labor Party’s mandate in the May elections, and continue the pursuit of peace, unless he can make Israel safe. But he must do so without abusing the rights of innocent Palestinians. (March 5, 1996)

In early May 1996, the Times praised Arafat:

The transformation of Yasir Arafat from sponsor of terrorism to proponent of peace still seems implausible. But there he was on Wednesday, welcomed warmly to the White House by President Clinton for the kind of Oval Office tete-a-tete reserved for Washington’s most honored guests. Earlier, Israel’s Labor Party dropped its longstanding opposition to a Palestinian state from its election platform . . . These developments reflect a recognition in the United States and Israel that Mr. Arafat has thus far largely lived up to his commitment to turn away from implacable opposition to Israel and move toward reconciliation and peace. The latest evidence of his sincerity was the recent removal from the P.L.O. charter of calls for the destruction of Israel . . . Mr. Arafat and the P.L.O. have demonstrated their desire to maintain the new peace between Israel and the Palestinians. As long as Mr. Arafat continues on this promising course, he deserves the economic development assistance that he has been promised . . . the assurance of a better economic life for Palestinians is necessary to consolidate the peace. Israel itself can contribute by lifting some of the economically damaging restrictions on the movements of Palestinian civilians after this month’s Israeli elections . . . Mr. Arafat and his Palestinian Authority, though far from perfect, represent one of the best available investments in Mideast peace. Assuming they maintain their present course, they deserve continued American support. (May 3, 1996)

Immediately after Benjamin Natanyahu’s electoral victory, the Times averred that

Washington is obliged to press Israel to proceed with the overdue withdrawal of most of its troops from Hebron, the last major Palestinian population center Israeli soldiers still patrol. The new Prime Minister has made clear his opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state and the surrender of Israeli sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem. But that need not prevent him from moving quickly to relax Israel’s economically crippling blockade of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which needlessly punishes and antagonizes Palestinian civilians. Nor should it stand in the way of resuming meaningful negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization and its leader, Yasir Arafat, over administrative, economic and territorial issues. (July 9, 1996)

Only a few days later, the Times expressed misgivings about Netanyahu:

. . . [Natanyahu’s] remarks [in Washington] last week seemed to cast doubt on his previous assurances that he would honor agreements Israel has already entered into, in particular the overdue withdrawal of most Israeli troops from the West Bank city of Hebron. He also diminished hopes for an early lifting of the five-month-old economic blockade of Palestinian communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip . . . the United States, as the principal international sponsor of Israel’s peace agreements with Egypt, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization, should press Mr. Netanyahu to resolve these doubts in the weeks ahead . . . Mr. Netanyahu would make a mistake if he took his warm public reception from the President, from a joint session of Congress and from American Jewish leaders as approval for the confrontational approach toward the Palestinians advocated by some of the extremist members of his Cabinet . . . the tight blockade that the previous Israeli Government imposed on Palestinian communities after the February terror bombings is causing great suffering while serving no evident security purpose. Mr. Netanyahu says he wants open economic borders between Israelis and Palestinians, but defers lifting the blockade . . . The Prime Minister was also disturbingly vague on the issue of new Jewish settlements . . . he left the impression that he intended to step up the pace of expansion and plant new settlements in populated Arab areas of the West Bank. (July 14, 1996)

Some months later, the Times offered additional criticism of Netanyahu:

Israel’s compliance [with the Oslo Accords] has not been accompanied by the kind of gestures and words that previously made the peace effort much more than a series of specific actions. The power of the Oslo accords came in large measure from the compromises and occasional leaps of faith that made the agreements possible, and the cooperative spirit of Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Mr. Netanyahu has done his part to erode that spirit by humiliating Mr. Arafat. He has failed to consult with the Palestinian leader or even inform him in advance about Israeli decisions like the move to begin construction of the Har Homa housing project in East Jerusalem . . . Mr. Netanyahu can be combative and difficult, as he made clear at a testy news conference in Washington this week. It cannot be easy for Mr. Clinton to jog him, but he must keep pressing the Israeli leader to take a more expansive approach to the peace effort and to be more forthcoming in his dealings with Mr. Arafat. The Palestinian leader could use a firm reminder from Mr. Clinton that violence will destroy the peace and anything short of a sustained campaign to prevent terrorism is insufficient. Only steps like these can overcome the mistrust that now threatens the peace. (April 9, 1997)

In a 1998 editorial, the Times had harsh words for the Israeli Supreme Court:

. . . word comes of an unfortunate decision by an Israeli supreme court panel authorizing the holding of 21 Lebanese men as a ”bargaining card” for future prisoner exchanges. Most of these men belong to the Lebanese group Hezbollah, which tries to kill Israeli soldiers in Lebanon and civilians in northern Israel. But Israel acknowledges that none of the 21 detainees, some of whom have been in custody for a decade, threaten Israeli security. Holding them is offensive, and also redundant, since Israel has plenty of legitimate Lebanese prisoners available for future exchanges. Workable peace in the Middle East requires that Israel and the Arabs develop more confidence in the fairness of each other’s security agencies. The way to achieve that is through professional and legitimate law enforcement methods, not trampling the rights of innocent detainees. (March 7, 1998)

With Ehud Barak installed as Israel’s Prime Minister, the Times turned to the subject of ending Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon:

Mr. Barak last year promised to withdraw from Lebanon within 12 months. But without substantial progress toward peace with Syria, Damascus may feel little incentive to restrain Hezbollah from attacking Israel’s withdrawing soldiers and newly vulnerable civilians. To prevent that, Mr. Barak is working hard to get stalled peace talks with Syria moving again. But his task was needlessly complicated last week by a parliamentary vote that would set unreasonable rules for the referendum that would be required to ratify an eventual peace agreement with Damascus. The vote was only a preliminary test of strength. But, disturbingly, it drew support from three parties belonging to the government coalition — the Sephardic religious party, Shas; the National Religious Party, whose constituency includes Jewish settlers; and Yisrael Baaliya, a Russian immigrant party. Mr. Barak needs to bring some of these defectors back into line to keep the referendum rules from being enacted into law. (March 6, 2000)

A few weeks after 9/11, Israel’s tourism minister was murdered by Palestinian terrorists, resulting in an ultimatum by Prime Minister Sharon. The Times reacted with these words:

The implication of Mr. Sharon’s ultimatum is that if his demands are not satisfied in the next few days, Israeli military forces could try to retake Palestinian-administered areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip by force. That would be a terrible setback for Israelis and Palestinians as well as Washington. (October 19, 2001)

In an editorial published soon after Arafat’s death, the Times had this to say about Sharon:

For the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, it must have been a moment of some satisfaction when his lifelong Palestinian nemesis departed for what many suspected would be a final flight to seek medical treatment in Paris. But for so long now, Mr. Sharon has dodged responsibility for creating a climate for potential peace by saying that there was no Palestinian negotiating partner so long as Mr. Arafat was in charge. Mr. Sharon may be running out of excuses. (November 6, 2004)

A few days later, the Times added this:

So the moment of truth has arrived. For the past four years, the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, and President Bush have used the very existence of Yasir Arafat to justify their abandonment of the peace process . . . Now Mr. Arafat is gone, and so are the excuses. In Mr. Arafat’s place is a Palestinian leadership that says it wants a smooth and democratic transfer of power and is prepared to talk if Mr. Sharon wants to . . . If [Sharon] wants to avoid Mr. Arafat’s fate - dying as a former hero turned obstacle to his people’s progress - he has to take advantage of it. As Israel’s greatest friend, the United States must do everything it can to make that happen. Unfortunately, Bush officials are tap-dancing, spouting the same tired excuses that America can’t do anything to restart the road map to peace until Palestinian extremists end their violence against Israel, and until Palestine has a leader America can trust . . . Israel can help shore up the credibility of moderate reformers by beginning a total freeze on settlements and beginning to address their calls to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. What better way to empower moderate leaders than by giving them something that Israel refused to give Yasir Arafat? (November 12, 2004)

It expanded on these sentiments a week later:

Mr. Sharon has long claimed that he’s been waiting for a moderate Palestinian leader, someone he can actually deal with, as opposed to Mr. Arafat, whom he viewed as duplicitous . . . The first order of business is to give the moderate Mr. Abbas something tangible to help him shore up his credibility with the Palestinian people. Mr. Sharon should immediately announce a complete freeze on settlement activity in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip . . . Next, Mr. Sharon has got to do all he can to expedite free, full and fair elections involving all Palestinians - including those in East Jerusalem . . . Over the years, there have miraculously been a few moments of possibility that have punctured the gloom that is the peace process in the Middle East: the talks at Oslo and at Camp David come to mind. Now we seem to have stumbled, through the death of Mr. Arafat, into another moment of opportunity. It would be criminally negligent if any of the principal leaders involved didn’t step up to the plate. Mr. Sharon, we await you, and we beg that you swing for the fences. (November 19, 2004)

Following Hamas’s victory in the January 2006 elections, the Times again lambasted Sharon:

Even though most reasonable people have recognized Mr. Abbas as a far more pragmatic negotiating partner than Yasir Arafat was, Prime Minister Sharon failed to give Mr. Abbas any concession that he could point to as an achievement. Instead, Israel has busied itself with carrying out Mr. Sharon’s doctrine of unilateral separation from the Palestinians, a doctrine that is sure to gain more favor now that the Palestinians have chosen Hamas. (January 27, 2006)

The Israel-Hezbollah was the subject of several editorials:

. . . even when acting justifiably in the face of aggression, Israel best serves its long-term security interests by acting wisely and proportionately. Its guiding principle must always be to focus military actions as narrowly as possible on those individuals, organizations and governments directly complicit in the attacks, while sparing the civilian populations that surround them . . . It is too soon to judge how well Israel is hewing to this standard in Lebanon. (July 13, 2006)

[Israel] needs to better adapt its methods to the circumstances it now faces. The point is to weaken and isolate Hamas and Hezbollah, while denying them opportunities to rally broader Arab support. To that end, Israel must focus its fire much more directly at the leaders and fighters of these two groups, and do far more to minimize the damage to civilian bystanders. (July 15, 2006)

There is a difference between justified and smart. Israel’s airstrikes against Hezbollah targets are legitimate so long as Hezbollah wages war against Israel and operates outside the control of the Lebanese government. But the air campaign is now doing Israel more harm than good. A better answer to the Hezbollah problem would be an immediate cease-fire . . . if Washington is now prepared to exercise diplomatic leadership on behalf of Israel’s security, rather than simply run interference for Israel’s military operations, a cease-fire now could become the first step to a more lasting solution. The glaring flaw in the administration’s logic is that there is no way that even weeks of Israeli airstrikes can eliminate more than a fraction of the 12,000 rockets Hezbollah is believed to have in Lebanon. And more weeks of television screens filled with Lebanese casualties, refugees and destruction would be a propaganda bonanza for the Hezbollahs and the Hamases, and a mounting political problem for the Arab world’s most moderate and pro-Western governments. Whatever a major Israeli ground offensive might achieve in military terms would have far too steep a political and diplomatic cost. (July 29, 2006)

It took the worldwide uproar over the Qana casualties to finally jolt the Bush administration into asking for something it should have sought many days earlier. Washington’s instant turnabout and Israel’s instant response has left the damaging impression that had America expressed similar concerns sooner, these and many other innocent Lebanese lives might have been saved . . . Renewed Israeli airstrikes and intensified ground operations can offer no lasting solution unless Israel is prepared to undertake another lengthy occupation to prevent resupply and regrouping. The most optimistic Israeli commanders concede it would take at least 10 to 14 more days to locate and destroy Hezbollah’s rockets and command post. The mounting civilian casualty toll that would accompany an Israeli offensive of that length would multiply the huge propaganda gains that Hezbollah, Syria and Iran have already reaped and multiply the damage to Israel and the United States. (August 1, 2006)

It took unconscionably long — almost a month — for the United Nations Security Council to produce a formula to end the fighting in Lebanon. While the diplomats dithered, hundreds of Lebanese and Israelis died, one-third of Lebanon’s population was uprooted, and new layers of anger and fear were sown on both sides of the border. (August 12, 2006)

In December 2006, Israel’s defense minister, Amir Peretz, approved the first new West Bank settlement in more than a decade. The Times reaction:

We hope Mr. Olmert or Israel’s Parliament can reverse Mr. Peretz’s damaging decision, taken in defiance of the international road map for Middle East peace, which Israel’s governing coalition has pledged to support . . . Unfortunately, it has become traditional in Israel to balance constructive gestures with sops to the politically potent settlers movement. The settlers’ agenda is not supported by a majority of Israelis. But no recent government has felt strong enough to resist their demands. Even when Mr. Sharon faced them down over Gaza, he compensated them with promises to expand existing West Bank settlements. Mr. Peretz has gone one regrettable step further by approving a wholly new settlement whose aim is to relocate settlers uprooted from Gaza last year. (December 27, 2006)