Neoconservatives… a Flashback
I am currently in the process of writing the final version of an essay about Bush, conservatism and neoconservatism. In my research, I stumbled upon this article at the Opinion Journal from 2005, written by Charles Krauthammer. It is a fascinating article in more than one regard: it provides us the opportunity to analyze the ideology of neoconservatives, but it also gives us a great opportunity to look back and see how confident neoconservatives were, only two years ago.
Krauthammer wrote:
In place of realism or liberal internationalism, the past 4 1/2 years have seen an unashamed assertion and deployment of American power, a resort to unilateralism when necessary, and a willingness to pre-empt threats before they emerge. Most importantly, the second Bush administration has explicitly declared the spread of freedom to be the central principle of American foreign policy. George W. Bush’s second inaugural address in January was the most dramatic and expansive expression of this principle. A few weeks later, at the National Defense University, the president offered its most succinct formulation: “The defense of freedom requires the advance of freedom.”
The remarkable fact that the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconservatism’s own transition from a position of dissidence, which it occupied during the first Bush administration and the Clinton years, to governance. Neoconservative foreign policy, one might say, has reached maturity. That is not only a portentous development, requiring some rethinking of principles and practice, but a rather unexpected one.
It is unexpected because, only a year ago, neoconservative foreign policy was being consigned to the ash heap of history. In the spring and summer of 2004, in the midst of increasing difficulties in Iraq, it was very widely believed that neoconservative policies had been run to the ground, that the administration that had purveyed them would soon be thrown out of office, and that internecine recriminations were about to begin over who lost the war on terror, the war in Iraq and indeed the reins of American foreign policy. One prominent columnist, speaking for the conventional wisdom of the moment, called the Bush project in Iraq “a childish fantasy.” And this, from a friend of neoconservatism.
As for the liberals who had come on board the project of liberating Iraq, they took its perceived foundering as an opportunity to engage in a mass jumping of ship. Some justified their abandonment of the Bush doctrine on the grounds that it was they who had been betrayed–by an administration whose incompetence, mendacity, political opportunism and various other crimes had ruined a policy that would already have been crowned with success if only they had been in charge of postwar Iraq, calibrating brilliantly precise troop levels, calculating to three decimal places the required degree of de-Baathification, and overseeing just about every other operational detail according to the dictates of their own tactical genius.
And goes on about liberals for a while, then:
The remarkable fact that the Bush doctrine is, essentially, a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy marks neoconservatism’s own transition from a position of dissidence, which it occupied during the first Bush administration and the Clinton years, to governance. Neoconservative foreign policy, one might say, has reached maturity. That is not only a portentous development, requiring some rethinking of principles and practice, but a rather unexpected one.
It is unexpected because, only a year ago, neoconservative foreign policy was being consigned to the ash heap of history. In the spring and summer of 2004, in the midst of increasing difficulties in Iraq, it was very widely believed that neoconservative policies had been run to the ground, that the administration that had purveyed them would soon be thrown out of office, and that internecine recriminations were about to begin over who lost the war on terror, the war in Iraq and indeed the reins of American foreign policy. One prominent columnist, speaking for the conventional wisdom of the moment, called the Bush project in Iraq “a childish fantasy.” And this, from a friend of neoconservatism.
As for the liberals who had come on board the project of liberating Iraq, they took its perceived foundering as an opportunity to engage in a mass jumping of ship. Some justified their abandonment of the Bush doctrine on the grounds that it was they who had been betrayed–by an administration whose incompetence, mendacity, political opportunism and various other crimes had ruined a policy that would already have been crowned with success if only they had been in charge of postwar Iraq, calibrating brilliantly precise troop levels, calculating to three decimal places the required degree of de-Baathification, and overseeing just about every other operational detail according to the dictates of their own tactical genius.
Today, there is no euphoria regarding the Iraq project, but sobriety has replaced panic. Things have changed, and what changed them was four elections: two in the West, and two in the Middle East. First came the re-election in Australia of John Howard, a firm ally of the administration. This presaged the re-election of George W. Bush, which reaffirmed to the world America’s staying power, gave popular legitimacy to the Bush doctrine, and established a clear mandate to continue the democratic project. The refusal of the American people last November to turn out a president who, rejecting an “exit strategy,” pledged instead to remain until Iraqi self-governance had been secured, was a seminal moment.
The other two elections took place in the areas of our exertion: first the Afghan elections, scandalously underplayed by the American media, then the Iraqi elections, impossible to underplay even by the American media. The latter were a historical hinge point. After a string of other important steps in Iraq that had been confidently dismissed as impossible and certainly impossible to do on time–the writing of an interim constitution, the transfer of power to an interim Iraqi government–came the greatest impossibility of all: free elections as scheduled. The overwhelming popular turnout, in what was essentially a referendum on the insurgency and on the democratic idea, sent a clear-cut message. Those who had said that the Iraqis, like Arabs in general, had no particular interest in self-government were wrong–as were those who claimed that the insurgency was a nationalist, anti-imperialist and widely popular movement.
But it gets better:
Alliances with dictatorships were justified in the war against fascism and the Cold War, and they are justified now in the successor existential struggle, the war against Arab/Islamic radicalism. This is not just theory. It has practical implications. For nothing is more practical than the question: After Afghanistan, after Iraq, what?
The answer is, first Lebanon, then Syria. Lebanon is next because it is so obviously ready for democracy, having practiced a form of it for 30 years after decolonization. Its sophistication and political culture make it ripe for transformation, as the massive pro-democracy demonstrations have shown.
Then comes Syria, both because of its vulnerability–the Lebanon withdrawal has gravely weakened Assad–and because of its strategic importance. A critical island of recalcitrance in a liberalizing region stretching from the Mediterranean to the Iranian border, Syria has tried to destabilize all of its neighbors: Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan and now, most obviously and bloodily, the new Iraq. Serious, prolonged, ruthless pressure on the Assad regime would yield enormous geopolitical advantage in democratizing, and thus pacifying, the entire Levant.
So, where are we at right now?
Bush has ordered a ’surge’ which will, most likely, last up to one year, the American people have stopped supporting him, they want “the troops” to “come home;” Democrats already put pressure on Bush to accept deadlines (although withdrew when Bush threated to veto it); it is considered to be unlikely that there will be many troops in Iraq by 2009, no matter what happens in the meantime; the war in Iraq works to the advantage of Democrats, and will be bad for the Republican nominee, whoever that will be in 08, etc., etc.
The confidence of Krauthammer, who wrote so arrogantly in 05, only two years ago , that Lebanon and Syria were next, was completely misplaced. The war in Iraq has proven to be a colossal failure and Charles and his neocon buddies have lost much of their influence. They were powerful for a couple of years, now it is time for them to go back to where they came from (University of Chicago anyone?).
Of course, there are neoconservatives who say that Bush’s problem is that neoconservatives do not have all that much power: they are mostly in the lower ranks, the real high ranks are not occupied by neoconservatives. Let me counter that by quoting Krauthammer:
Another important sign of the maturing of neoconservative foreign policy is that it is no longer tethered to its own ideological history and paternity. The current practitioners of neoconservative foreign policy are George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Condoleezza Rice and Donald Rumsfeld. They have no history in the movement, and before 9/11 had little affinity to or affiliation with it.
The fathers of neoconservatism are former liberals or leftists. Today, its chief proponents, to judge by their history, are former realists. Ms. Rice, for example, was a disciple of Brent Scowcroft; Mr. Cheney served as secretary of defense in the first Bush administration. September 11 changed all of that. It changed the world, and changed our understanding of the world. As neoconservatism seemed to offer the most plausible explanation of the new reality and the most compelling and active response to it, many realists were brought to acknowledge the poverty of realism–not just the futility but the danger of a foreign policy centered on the illusion of stability and equilibrium. These realists, newly mugged by reality, have given weight to neoconservatism, making it more diverse and, given the newcomers’ past experience, more mature.
I have to totally agree with you on this one- Krauthammer has about as much credibility as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz on this issue. While it is true the implementation by the Bush administration was poor, the theory behind it has never been proven to work either. As Westerners, it is difficult for us to understand a culture that wouldn’t value our freedoms. But our morality and views are fundamentally different and imposing them on a country that lacks the underlying philosophy ,traditions and belief system that Westerners cling to is absurd.
I’d like to write a longer response, but I don’t have time at the moment.
The problem with foreign policy is the lack of alternatives.
The neo-conservative approach was almost an old fashioned liberal one. It believed that, if freed from the shackles of dictatorship, the peoples of the Third World in general and the Arab world in particular would opt for western type freedom.
This approach took seriously the idea of extending freedoms to these places, but underestimated their capacity to develop such freedoms.
Unfortunately the collapse of neo-conservatism seems to have left Realism as the only foreign policy doctrine left standing. Realism suggests that if people in the Third World are being oppressed by their government then tough luck to them. It’s not our problem.
Well, there are some important differences between Wilsonian democracy and neoconservatism. Wilson placed a great deal of faith in international institutions and their ability to stop tyranny and the destruction of war. He ruined his health trying to convince Congress and the nation to support our entry into the League of Nations, which he personally helped to organize as part of the Treaty of Versailles. He believed the Western world would not survive another conflict like WWI, and most nations that joined felt the same way. But the Congress was still largely conservative and isolationist, and he could not get them to approve of the League. Without US support, the League was too weak to survive and collapsed.
However, by the end of WWII, Truman had better luck getting congressional approval of our entry into the UN, which was similar to the League. Maybe it’s worked because until now, most conflicts have been regional.
Neoconservatives, OTOH, have little or no faith in the ability of international institutions to control tyranny or wars between nations, and so have sought to weaken them. Some even believe that the WB, IMF and UN are so corrupt that we should withdraw from them altogether. But we have not had much luck with unilateralism either, as it usually comes across as an arrogant use of force to other nations, especially with the clumsy implementation we have seen with Bush/Cheney and Rice.
Oh gosh Kritter.
I would encourage you folks to read my 4 parter on “What Price Freedom”
The war against communism was driven by Neoconservative principals that at the time had not even been defined as such.
It works. In fact it has been proven to be very effective. The problem is that Bush took it one step too far.
IMPORTANT: Neocon principals do not require actually attacking or invading countries.
That is what Bush and his Neocons did wrong. We used Neocon principals during the entire cold war and never once invaded a country. We were invited to defend freedoms in Korea and Vietnam.
So I would disagree with your statement its never been proven to work. Neocon principals state quite clearly that
If other nations are safe, secure and peaceful then the USA is safe, secure and peaceful. This is a NO BRAINER. Its Nafta. Its the cold war. Its Europe. Its now being put to work in Eastern Europe. It is THE FOREIGN POLICY that works.
Incidently Michael I await your work with anticipation.
lthomas-
I thought our CW policy was aimed at propping up any govt that was willing to allign with us instead of the Soviets. Which meant that we backed some rather unsavory characters like Pinochet , the Shah of Iran and Ferdinand Marcos, and trained their security forces how to repress their own people. We didn’t care what they did as long as they didn’t swear allegiance to Moscow.
Many third world countries later ended up with populist anti-US leaders, once that policy ended, which is why we now have leaders like Chavez, who capitalize on the anti-US sentiment to maintain their power base. When rebels fought against a Communist leaning govt, they automatically were labelled “freedom fighters” (like the Contras) and armed and trained by our special forces. The bubbling over of animosity from the CW years is partially due to the policies we enacted during that era, when our only goal was suppressing Soviet influence in the third world.
Its true. People really do apologize for winning the war against communism.
I never thought I would hear someone actually declare that the USA was the evil in the war on communism.
I guess it goes without saying if you live long enough you will see or hear pert near everything.
lthomas- my background is political science with a history minor. I look at these things through an informational lens- not a simplistic black/white good/bad one. I never apologized for winning the war against Communism or said we were more evil than the Soviets- both sides took up with some strange bedfellows. As far as the results of the CW, there have been both good results and unforeseen negative ones.
Good ones are that new markets opened up, we have a free cultural exchange with countries that were previously shut off to us, and millions of people now enjoy democracy. Negative results include insecurity caused by selling nuclear arms on the black market, the end of the MAD dynamic (mutually assured destruction) and break-up of Yugoslavia with genocide from ethnic cleansing. Also our alliances with repressive governments created unwanted side effects like the rise of the Taliban after we armed and trained the muhajadeen to fight the Soviets in Afhanistan.
If you read portions of the 9/11 Commission’s report they say the same thing- that was what Ron Paul has been pointing out. What’s your next comment going to say- “why do you hate America”?? But I didn’t judge the US for our past-just told you why it wasn’t a neoconservative approach in foreign policy, just a realistic one. I think some of the rhetoric about “evil” is just to get the populace pumped up for the battle. People loved Reagan when he called the Soviets the “Evil Empire”- yet once he travelled their and learned more about their culture he no longer thought on those simplistic terms. He still wanted to bring down Communism ,of course.
If you want to disagree with facts- go ahead, but we have done some great things and some not-so-great things in foreign policy- I actually do not believe in saving the rest of the world from tyranny- Bush’s ideal. Its been a tragic failure so far.
Much better response then your first one. However
I would argue that the approach to the foreign affairs absolutely is totally neoconservative.
Their principal is simple. Project power (Not invade country after country) and convince bad countries to become good. Strongly encourage other nations to be safe and secure and that way America is safe and secure.
Now you can argue round in circles about it all you want because you have it appears grown to detest the word Neocon but the facts are the facts.
Neocons did not invent this form of foreign policy. It was in place a long time before the term Neocon was even coined. They just simply embraced this philosophy and have expanded upon it.
This is and has been the centerpiece of the USA’s foreign policy since the start of WW2. Its akin to fighting crime with police officers. Now you can do other things, have other strategies, try other things but in the end the centerpiece of fighting crime is police officers.
Kritter lastly the reason those of you in your camp get the:
“Why do you hate America?” tag hung on you is because nearly every post you make including the ones here have hanging over your every word, just out of reach, implied but denied is this:
“America sucks because………..In this post because we FOUGHT A WAR AND WON.”
Its there. Perhaps you don’t see it but those of us who stand on the other side see it and feel it and its like the old saying “The tension was so thick you could cut it with a knife.”
The antiwar has become quite proficient at accusing themselves of “Hating America and then blaming it on the other guy.”
Not once did I say you hated America. I said you want to apologize for everything America did in the WAR against communism.
When you fight a WAR some unsavory things happen. You get in bed with some not so scrupulous characters. That is the nature of war Kritter. Its ugly business. I will make no apologies for trying to protect America. I also make no apologies for attempting to make life better in other countries as a result of our policy. If it fails then it is the other countries fault not Americas. We tried. Its like having an operation for cancer. We tried to cure you. Because we could not does not mean the doctors should be shot. They tried. Not trying is almost certainly a guarantee of failure.
If Democracy fails in Iraq. If it becomes a killing field. If it turns into a blood bath it is the Iraqis faults not our own. We tried hard to help them succeed.
This is at the center of our foreign policy. Realism be damned. If your a realist you stand on the sidelines and dont attempt anything because the challenges are daunting. That is why Bush and his entire Administration rejected the 911 report. I have read it. In fact on another blog I posted one of their tenets and the antiwar started screaming.
I posted another and another not telling them it was word for word from the 911 commission and they just went into a frothing frenzy. The antiwar claims the 911 commission as their holy grail because it appears to be antibush.
If we followed the 911 commissions recomendations this war would have cost us a trillion dollars now instead of 500 billion and we would be at war with Pakistan, Syria, Iran, Somalia, BUT NOT IRAQ.
That statement, is how your side evades responsibility for propping up dictatorsand corrupt leaders and helping them maintain their power by training them to terrorize their own populace. We sold Saddam many of his WMD’s and stood by silently when he used them on his own people. We were never worried about his people then only his ability to threaten Iran.
I’m not saying that we never have good intentions- but tell that to the hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who have lost their lives, or the 2 million who have had to flee the country. Good intentions are not enough, but its nice that you can convince yourself that they are.
And maybe you can convince yourself that the CW was about helping others around the world- but if it was give facts - and don’t evade responsibility by clinging to the chimera of good intentions.
BTW, Patriotic Americans can love their country and disapprove of its leadership and its policies. 70% currently do.
For one thing the USA did not sell Saddam WMDS. See Germany and France cupability in this regard. The Europeans who had their hand in the cookie jar helped Saddam build WMD facilities so he could build his own WMD’s. Selling WMD’s even covertly would have gotten our president impeached no matter which one was in office when your assertions were made.
Yes we supplied Iraq with Weapons. Just like the USSR was supplying IRAN with weapons. We did not start the war in Iraq.
However now your apologizing for that one too. Somehow now your saying we should have stopped Saddam from gassing Iranians and his own people.
How? Invasion. We tried that and your against that too. UN? We tried that for 12 years. Nothing. Then for 12 more years and nothing.
Nothing we do meets your approval. The left only wants foreign policy by consensus. Don’t act unless their is a poll that says 99 percent is in favor of it and it meets with some utopian goal.
Your reality based foreign policy would garner nothing. It would garner an Isolated America and the world would be in far worse shape then it is now.
I will grant you one thing though. We did prop up a lot of dictators.
Turkey
Israel
Germany
France
England
Ireland
Greece
Denmark
Finland
Vietnam
Korea
Cambodia
Laos
Phillipines
Indonesia
Austrailia
New Zealand
Ukraine
Belarus
Slovakia
Hungary
Poland
Spain
Portugal
Monaco
Egpyt
Saudia Arabia
Bahrain
Kuwait
Pakistan
But I suppose you are looking at the two or three failed supports. Such as Iraq, Vietnam and Iran.
That settles it 25 success and three failures…Bad USA> Bad!
lthomas - Impressive list of countries but how you can count Belarus, Pakistan, Egypt, Saudia Arabia, Laos, Cambodia as successes is beyond me. Furthermore, in the early stages of the Iran/Iraq war we authorized Israel, Jordan, and Egypt to transfer American weapons to Iran. The Iran Contra deal was a very small part of our armament transfers. In the end, we worked both sides of the war.
Your speculation that the world would be in far worse shape if the US withdrew from the world stage is unprovable conjecture. Your opinions in the matter carry no more weight than anyone elses opinion.
What? Our policy during the cold war was driven by neoconservative thought? Someone tell Kissinger, Brzezinski, Scowcroft and Baker! Containment is the exact opposite of what I’ve ever read neoconservatives espouse, birthing pains are necessary and all that. I will agree that not all neoconservative thought says that the transformation has to be militarily based, but it is at heart radical.
Our cold war policy was concerned with keeping communism from spreading, but only tangentially with regime changes in countries where it was ruling. lthomas, saying that we used “neoconservative” principles in the coldwar is like defining neoconservatism as helping our friends and fighting our enemies. All foreign policy does that.
The disdain for international institutions is at the heart of neoconservatism. But in the Korean war the UN was an official ally.
Also, I would hardly say that we were “invited” into Vietnam. Supporting an unpopular dictator in not holding reunification elections [President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed U.S. fears when he wrote that "80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh." according to Wikipedia] and then supporting his coup when he proved ineffectual and feeling that we had to send troops when the Communists took advantage of the chaos is hardly a ringing endorsement. [On a side note this was in the wikipedia article as well: "In a conversation with Nobel Peace Prize winner and Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, Kennedy sought his advice. "Get out," Pearson replied. "That's a stupid answer," shot back Kennedy. "Everyone knows that. The question is: How do we get out?""]
When it comes down to it we made a lot of mistakes and supported some really bad guys, but overall stability and maintaining permanent international coalitions was the main goal. Neoconservatism isn’t interested in coalitions as a goal and (at least professes) that democracy and freemarkets need to be spread across the globe, and cooperations with dictators are theoretically temporary until our soft power overthrows them as well. It’s a revolutionary doctrine.
Yeah, I have to say that I see it more as Mikkel describes too. In fact, one reason that I supported the Neocon idea of overthrowing Saddam is because I felt we needed to move away from the Cold War realpolitik. I am not brilliant enough to know of a strategy that would have been better to fight the Cold War, but I always felt uncomfortable with some of the sinister alliances. Since the Cold War had ended, I had been anxious for some of the problems to be corrected. Getting rid of a tyrant that we’d previously supported and instead promoting a democracy certainly seemed appealing; it’s just unfortunate that the assumptions I had made (principally, that there was a realistic plan for promoting that nascent democracy in a hostile environment) were incorrect.
CS personally what pains me is that I agree with the assumptions that stable democracies (and especially free markets) are a great boon to world security and peace. This isn’t a neoconservative idea per se but is a running strain through American idealism (I’d hardly call Wilson a neoconservative for instance, but they had the same goals and his were just through global institutions).
However I don’t see any reason to believe that democracies are any more likely to act in our national interest and this is the kicker. I’m not sure we’re capable of letting the process take hold for the simple fact that we are the global superpower (plus most of the world is a lot more conservative than us) and therefore (rightly and wrongly) have lots of antagonism against us…. In the short term, most democracies will act contrary to our wishes even as they remain spiritual kin. Can we accept this?
Also, it takes a lot of social, political and economic institutions to create a successful democracy. Latin America and Africa certainly have shown that free voting doesn’t necessarily produce success. The world as a whole is too impatient and that is the reason for much of our failure. I think China (well much of Southeast Asia) has the perfect idea about how to transition even if they are needlessly brutal. This is why I think it’s frustrating that our foreign policy is so concerned with intervention instead of really focusing on making sure that prosperity comes to our philosophical allies. Then we could sit back and help others when they come for help guiding their own countries on the same path.
Oh, in hindsight I certainly agree with you, Mikkel.
Good comments, and I agree also. The problem may be that we acted to push democracy too late. Years of backing repressive governments have come back to haunt us in the form of terrorist acts. All we have done in Iraq, Palestine and Egypt is unleash a lot of rage towards us, Israel and competing sects. I think if Arab nationalism had been allowed to flourish in the 1920’s- the days of Lawrence of Arabia- it might have been different. But then there wouldn’t have been decades of access to cheap ME oil.
But you guys dont even understand Neoconservative principals.
Somehow it has become synonomous with attacking countries because of GWB and the GWOT.
It is not. It is about projecting power. It is NOT using power to win the day. In fact the main tenet of Neconservative principals is projecting power without using power to attain your aims. A classic example of this is the two naval fleets in the gulf right now doing military exercises. They are projecting power without using power. The USA and its allies did this incessantly during the cold war in Europe and elsewhere around the world.
We contained them by projecting power. We did not contain them by projecting weakness. AS I said it was a tenet of the Neocons that had not even been defined yet other then as containment. The Neocon simply embraced the philosophy that was already part of our foreign policy.
Sorry but you have taken Bush and his neocons as the DEFINING moment in Neocon philosophy when in fact Bush and company Corrupted the concepts of Neoconservative principals. Even Bush in his election campaign said he did not believe in nation building.
I was reading the exchange between CStanley and Mikkel and thinking how nicely they stated their agreement about democracies, and then I was jarred.
China is the perfect ecample, eveni if they are unnecessarily brutal?
I’m afraid I can’t quite swallow ‘perfect example’ and ‘unnecessarily brutal’ in the same sentence.
And who are these philosophical allies to whom we would bring prosperity? Is China our philospphical ally? Where - re Iran or re Darfur?
Now that democracy has fallen as the pursued goal. are we pinning all our hopes on prosperity?
I certainly don’t have the answer to solve all the world’s problems. But it seems to me that, if we’ve learned anything from recent experience, it should be a lesson about pursuing a single goal. a single approach with blinders on to shut out all the side effects.
To bank on prosperous countries becoming our allies seems no more realistic than the hopes held for establishing democracies.
I’m afraid I can’t buy the idealism of the market approach any more than I could the proposal to establish a democracy in Iraq. The world is just not that simple to manipulate. Like the cold war, all gains will come with a price tag, and we should not forget to check what’s on the tag. I am not against globalization, BTW. I’m simply saying we should keep our eyes on what’s behind us and to the left and the right, as well as in front.
PS Young people in China don’t recognize the picture of the lone man stnading in front of a tank in Tianmen Square. They know nothing about the events there. And we have stopped caring, as well. That’s one of the price tags.
domajot: I meant they were a perfect example of establishing the social and governmental precursors to democracy. They are certainly not there yet and are not an ideological ally. I’m just saying that in general I do buy the idea that (truly) prosperous countries eventually make the transition. [It can be argued that China isn't a truly prosperous country since the vast majority of its citizens are hopelessly poor and it's building internal strife. I think they have a good chance, but there is nothing that is inevitable.]
Also the stuff I talked about is certainly idealistic and I would be terrified if it became the singular goal of our foreign policy. I just think it should be a larger part of the [especially NGO] toolset.
lthomas, projecting power like you speak of has been a key tactic in achieving foreign policy aims since antiquity. Even the Romans would avoid wars when they could get the same conquest through projection.
I guess I would agree that the neoconservatives seem to view projection of power as a goal instead of a tool. That’s partially why I find them so dangerous. A lot of them seem to advocate projection of strength as the be all and end all. After all, the US is the most powerful country that has ever existed, how could they not submit!
This philosophy has the same problems that I’ve observed in some of my friends that have never interacted outside of the upper classes. It fails to realize that the bulk of the world is used to being downtrodden and sees themselves as victims. They don’t fear us because they are already full of fear; just as in the Dao, Lao Tzu says that there cannot be law without basic prosperity, because death is no deterent to those that already live it.
You might say that it is the projection that is emphasized and war is to be avoided, but if the projection isn’t working and strength is what is held as the highest ideal then what choice is there other than war?
Mikkel-
Okay. I understand better.
By nature, I’m suspicious of all simple formulas for success.
Also by nature, I remember Tianmen Square.
Good point again, Mikkel. Those who are downtrodden and hopeless will not fear us because there’s nothing more that we can do to them. They may actually view death as a relief.
Projection of power for its own sake (imo is basically behaving like the world’s bully) usually comes back to haunt us. We have seen it in Iraq where US supported candidates did poorly in elections, and public opposition against us rose as our liberation became an occupation. In South and Latin America, populist leaders have won important elections with an anti-US platform. I see it as an abuse of our superpower status, and suspect many other nations do as well.
I still believe in working to strengthen international institutions, and using soft power to strengthen our alliances.
Yes and again you are ascribing to Neoconservatives that which is not true.
The projection of power is meant to NOT HAVE TO USE FORCE.
This is where the current administration has failed the Neocon test and now all Neocons are bad because they ascribed to the invasion of Iraq.
I have said that the Neocons did not invent foreign policy. They took that which was being used the most effectively and embraced it and more narrowly focused it.
Now it used to be called containment. I repeat the principals of containing an enemy is from a position of strength not weakness. This is what the Neocons believe. Now however the sole purpose of neocon philosophy is somehow been twisted into Nation building, invading and conquering and that is not the NEOCON way at all.
Again I repeat. neocons did not invent foreign policy. Containment thru strength of power was our position during the Cold War. It was Reagan’s way by building a 600 ship navy, increasing the budget drastically, building star wars, building the peacemaker ICBM which was deadly accurate, building the Ohio Class Nuclear submarine…etc…etc….it was this projection of strength and power that ensured that communists did not spread.
Neoconservativism/Containment was used in nations to install a government opposed to communism and then help them NATION build so that the above governments were in line idealogically with America. It was done through out the world from the 40’s to the 90’s.
Really I would ask you to open your mind a bit to history of this time period, then ask yourself once again what the neocons believe and you will see that they quite simply believed in what the USA was doing all along. Just more of it and with more ooommmppphhhh.
Neoconservativism is not anything new. Its just been redefined and given a new name that the Democrats/antiwar have turned into a hate mongering name. The mere mention of it makes the hair on the antiwars necks stand up.
lthomas I’m very confused how you decry realist foreign policy but then talk about “containment” which is the #1 aspect of realism positively.
Also you say we are mischaracterizing neoconservatism but you’re not defining what it’s strategic goals are. You say we need to project power, but to what end? Is it to create regime change (through peace even) or is it to accept that there are countries that are rivals and prevent them from spreading influence or is it to get them to do whatever we want?
I should also mention that from a operational level it is immaterial what the “true” neocon way is if all the leading neocons are advocating invasion. Stalinists and Maoists were hardly pure Communists that exemplified Marx, but Communism was correctly derided because of them.
Neoconservative strategic goals:
Peace thru strength.
Projection of power so that force is not necessary.
Working with nations to help them nation build without the need to Invade them and force our will upon them.
Material support. Assistance in joining the worldwide citizenship of the prosperous. The encouraging of nations to become strong, peaceful and prosperous so that the USA benefits by having one more peaceful nation in our midst.
A classic example of this is look at how popular Hezzbollah is in Southern Lebanon as they pass out money and tend to the needs of people in need.
But to lay out specifics would have to include the nation in question and what our aims are. For as with all policy it changes with the region, nation, cultures, races and reality of the area in question. Venezuela presents different problems then Iraq and as such the Policy would be shaped for that nation in that region of the world.
However I would like to know where I decry Realism in foreign policy.
Realism is for me: the facts are the facts. Now what do we do with these facts to make them work to our advantage.
To that end I would have to ask you the same thing. What is the goals of a realistic foreign policy? What is its purpose?
I personally do not believe that realism is or can be a foreign policy but rather an aspect of a foreign policy. It is a part of the whole. It should be a part of any foreign policy but it cannot and must not be the Whole of foreign policy.
Maybe I misinterpreted this “Realism be damned. If your a realist you stand on the sidelines and dont attempt anything because the challenges are daunting. That is why Bush and his entire Administration rejected the 911 report. I have read it.”
I thought you meant that they rejected it because it was Realist and therefore worthy of it.
Anyway I think your view of Realism isn’t entirely accurate. Wikipedia has more but the point is that Realism is the classical driver of geopolitics.
For me the major points (repeated in the article) are:
States are rational actors that act out of national interest (mainly driven by military might and resources).
States are amoral.
States are the primary actors.
Therefore it is concerned primarily with the actions of countries and how they relate to our interests. The government and economic structure is of little importance, and no government is “good” or “evil” but just on different teams.
All of the things you listed as goals are strategies that may be employed by Realists to work towards an aim.
To me neoconservatism differs because:
It believes that the morality of states is important and that they are “good”/”evil” and this is a factor in policy.
Democracy/capitalism are the best system and it should be spread as an end (as oppossed to realism where they might be spread but primarily as a means to accomplish some other goal.)
Populaces and other “secondary actors” have more importance and should be directly communicated with. Projection of power for neoconservatism is largely to get populations on our side or not work against us, while for Realists it’s to convince the state (i.e. the power brokers) itself that it’s not in its best interest.
This is why I said that at heart it is radical. It is aimed at changing countries to our system under a inevitability of history view, and this is the primary aim. It can be accomplished militarily or by convincing the populace to switch and rise up.
While I understand the realism of a foreign policy I still fail to see how in and of itself it is a foreign policy.
What you have stated is just a variation of Neoconservativism foreign policy.
Ahh but herein lies the failure of a realist foreign policy.
How do you deal with a fragmented nation?
Somalia, Sudan, Vietnam, Afghanistan for example.
With nations that are fragmented then the basis of realism collapses because they are not:
Amoral or primary actors. They do not act in unison for the common good of their citizens. Splinter groups force the nation into many different directions and therefore the economic, political and social fabric of the society is in question. The driving force behind Neoconservativism is to give them a direction and a way to go. It is not necessarily Democratic so much as it is safe and secure.
So again I feel as if realism in foreign policy must be a part of policy but not THE policy.