A short while after I published a post about an article that appeared today in the Washington Post, I received an e-mail from the National Journal’s Neil Munro. Neil shared two things with me: first, an article he wrote which appeared in the 5/12/07 edition of the National Journal; second, information from what will remain an unnamed source. According to the source, “there is a fundamental flaw” in before mentioned WaPo article: the US doesn’t know “who is killing whom.”

Let’s start with Neil’s article first (called “Sunnis Break With Al Qaeda”): in it, Neil explains that “most observers agree that the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, particularly in the Western province of Anbar, is splintering.” Some Sunni insurgent groups join forces with the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government and US military forces. There is, however, one question: is this a “short-term phenomenon or a longer-term trend that could help turn the tide against the insurgency”?

In the province of Anbar, “the divisions are changing the battlefield” (also read this article at TIME about that). Anbar “has been the heartland of the Sunni insurgency since 2004.” Recently, however, many Sunni tribes in the region “united into the Anbar Salvation Front, which claims to have deployed 20,000 militiamen against Al Qaeda.” Besides that, “U.S. military officials, trying to deepen the splits through economic aid and deals with Sunni tribes, say they have recruited more than 4,500 locals — including former insurgents — in recent months to serve in the Anbar police force. Together, the U.S. military and the Iraqi security forces, according to numerous recent media reports, have largely pacified Ramadi, the capital of Anbar province, which one Army intelligence report last year wrote off as lost.”

Neil quotes US Col. Steven Boylan who said that the before mentioned change in Anbar “does matter.” He added that “the bigger issue is that the sheiks in Anbar and their tribes realize … they’re going toward a potential future” of cooperation with the Baghdad government.

What might have triggered the split is debated: some believe that Al Qaeda overreached “when it announced the formation of the ‘Islamic State in Iraq’ and declared the state’s leader to be a mysterious man named Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, titled ‘Prince of the Faithful’.” The combination of his name and title ” - which asserts that he is a Sunni from Baghdad and a descendant of Muhammad - is one step short of declaring him to be the Islamic caliph, who serves as both monarch of all Muslims and as Allah’s representative on earth.”

Others say that Sunni leaders initially thought that they would be able to beat the US forces and take over the Iraqi government (also with the help of other Sunni countries). That’s why they invited Al Qaeda - who does not want to compromise with the Shiite-dominated government - to join the fight. The United States, however, “has prevented any overt intervention by neighboring Sunni states, has won support from some Sunni communities, and has been able to capture or kill many insurgents.” Besides that, Shiite insurgents are taking revenge: whenever Al Qaeda kills Shiites, Shiite militias strike back hard. In other words, Sunni leaders have, according to this theory, concluded that they cannot win this battle and that it is in their interest to work together with the US and al-Maliki et al. Al Qaeda doesn’t want to compromise, Al Qaeda wants to continue fighting, thus, Al Qaeda has to be eliminated.

Lastly, “Sunnis in Saudi Arabia are also nudging Iraqi Sunnis to turn against Al Qaeda… Saudi Arabia’s primary goal is the eradication of Al Qaeda, and it is using its plentiful money and Arab tribal connections to firm up an anti-Qaeda front.”

Sounds nice and all, but there are problems: American soldiers often complain, for instance, that the Iraqi government “often hinders even such simple cooperation with the Sunnis as the delivery of reconstruction funds, police payrolls, uniforms, and ammunition.” Also, Sunnis might join forces with the US for now, just to make sure that the US withdraws as soon as possible. If Al Qaeda loses its foothold in Iraq, some Sunni leaders might think, the US will withdraw and full scale civil war can break out (which they still hope to win).

It’s a highly interesting article which should be read by every single one of you.

The situation in Anbar is improving, we are told, but at the same time sectarian violence is, according to this article in the Washington Post, on the rise. Sudarsan Raghavan writes that “more than three months into a U.S.-Iraqi security offensive designed to curtail sectarian violence in Baghdad and other parts of Iraq, Health Ministry statistics show that such killings are rising again.”

The source I mentioned at the very start of this post, e-mailed that Raghavan’s article contains “a fundamental problem”: the US does not know “who is killing whom.”

As far as anybody knows, “some of the deaths are ordinary crime,” which are of course “the least politically disruptive.” Other deaths are caused by Shia groups fighting against each other. Interestingly enough, the source points out that this option “may be the most dangerous, because it could create a civil war among the Shia.”

There is, however, more: some of the deaths, included by the Washington Post in the statistics, are caused by Sunni insurgents fighting against fellow Sunnis. This is considered to be “arguable good and desirable, insofar as less-bad Iraqi nationalist Sunnis” kill “more-bad” Al Qaeda terrorists.

Of course, there is also the Iraqi government which is backing “a dirty war” against Sunni insurgents. This is both “undesirable and unnerving,” but is, ironically enough, “perhaps the major factor” in causing the Sunni-Sunni killings, which - again - aren’t considered to be all that bad.

Furthermore, “some of the deaths are AQ or Iranian-funded terrorism against economic targets – doctor, real-estate agents, trash-workers, professors, etc.” These murders are quite effective in disrupting the economy. These people form the backbone of the Iraqi economy.

Lastly, one has to realize that quite a lot of deaths are caused by “Shia groups’ freelance killing of Sunni civilians, property-owners, doctors, ex-Baathists, Air Force pilots, etc.” These killings are “the most sectarian and destructive.”

So, the question Sudarsan Raghavan should have asked himself is… who are these people and who killed them? If Sunnis want to eliminate Al Qaeda, and if they are doing their best to kill as many Al Qaeda fighters as possible, it is quite logical for the death count to go up, but, in this scenario, more deaths can hardly be considered to be a bad thing; in fact, it would be proof that the new American strategy might be paying off. On the other hand, if the ones being killed are Sunni civilians, doctors, etc., the situation drastically changes; in that case, one might very well argue that the surge is, indeed, not working.

It has to be repeated time and time again: as cold as this may sound, what matters is not how many people are being killed, what matters is who is being killed and why. Over the years, Iraq has become a safe haven for terrorists of all stripes. If one wants to create a stable and democratic Iraq, these terrorists (or insurgents) have to be either kicked out of the country, imprisoned or, yes, eliminated.