Turkey’s Identity Problem: What are the Causes?
Filed under: Political Islam, Secularism, Turkey — Michael van der Galien, Editor-in-Chief on April 23, 2007 @ 6:30 pm CEST
A great column at Today’s Zaman about Turkey’s ‘identity problem’:
It is hard to avoid the impression that every issue in Turkish politics somehow relates to the country’s complex identity problems. From the Kurdish question to whether the president’s wife can wear a headscarf, we are always debating identity issues.
Yet we are often unable to address the root causes of the problem. A major part of the problem has to do with the peculiarity of Turkey’s “civilizational” dilemmas with “Westernization.” Having a complex civilizational identity, or being a “torn country” to use Samuel Huntington’s terminology, is part of Turkish history. Indeed, the difficulty with assigning Turkey to a specific geography or civilization derives from the fact that it had always been a border country. A glance at the map shows why Turkey does not fit into any of the clear-cut geographical categories formulated by Western scholars. The country straddles the geographical and cultural borders between Europe and Asia, without really belonging to either. Such an “in-between” Turkish identity is made all the more complicated by a number of historical factors.Perhaps most important is the fact that the Ottoman Empire was historically the intimate enemy of Europe. In religious and military terms, the Turk represented “the other” who played a crucial role in consolidating Europe’s own Christian identity. However, as centuries of Ottoman imperial splendor came to an end and territorial regression began, the Ottoman ruling elite sought salvation in one of the earliest projects of modernization. Since modernization was pragmatically identified with Christian Western Europe, the Ottomans faced major difficulties in adapting to the new paradigm without surrendering their Islamic pride. Throughout the 19th century, the result has often been a chaotic coexistence of traditional Islamic and modernized institutions. This situation did not change until the radicalization of the Westernization project, first under the Young Turks and later under their Kemalist successors.
The Kemalist revolution was by far the most radical attempt at cultural transformation in the Islamic world. Yet, it achieved a rather limited penetration of Turkish society at large. Especially the rural parts of Anatolia remained largely unaffected by the social engineering taking place in Ankara during the single party rule. In that sense, the Kemalism was too state-centered and elitist to be fully absorbed by Anatolian society. As in Ottoman times, it was essentially the governing elite and the urban bourgeoisie that supported Westernization and easily adapted to its norms. In the meantime, the gap between the state and rural periphery widened even further.
Right after the second world war, the Kemalist regime was forced to hold multiparty elections: different parties divided the country in to left and right and, “Kurdish and Islamic dissent were no longer high on the political agenda, since they soon came to be absorbed by the new political divisions in Turkey.”
When left-wing and rightwing politics lost their relevance with the end of the Cold War, Kurdish and Islamic dissent quickly re-emerged. This Kurdish and Islamic revival during the 1990s once again triggered a strong Kemalist reaction. After the long Cold War interlude, it was as if Turkey was back in the 1930s. The military had to take the initiative against Kurdish-Islamic forces by forcefully reasserting Turkish nationalism and secularism. The result was the “lost decade” of the 1990s. If we want to avoid another lost decade, now that similar dynamics are once again at play, we need to find liberal solutions to our identity problems.
Read the whole thing at Today’s Zaman.
I find this to be a more than fascinating subject. Turkey’s ‘identity problem’ is highly interesting, not in the least because Western European nations struggle with the same problem these days. Oversecularization, moral relativism and a sense that it is wrong to be proud of one’s country and history, combined with the constant flow of Muslim immigrants have caused many European countries to have some of the same problems Turkey has.
1 EB
April 23, 2007 @ 9:00 pm CESTOne can call this as a problem, but I do not call it like that. Like other countries, Turkey has some origins. This leads to the different views on politics. Different groups use their rights and found political parties according to their interests. For instance, in my country, Turkey, we have communist party, socialist party, democrat party and republican party. Turkey shelters those different kinds of parties. As a necessity of democracy, citizens vote to their interests. Instead of calling of the “problem”, I believe it is better to say “diversity”
I disagree with using the word “oversecularism” Secularism is the way separating religion with official issues. There is either secularism or not. I do not see the oversecularism in my country.
For the issue of immigrants in Western Countries, I know the adaptation problems as two sides are very different. I believe that the happening of this is unavoidable; but with the help of two sides, the negative effects can be less.
2 mvdg
April 23, 2007 @ 9:09 pm CESTWell, as you know, with oversecularization I mean that people do not just believe in the separation between Church and State, but try to extinguish religion from every part of life, and, in essence, replace moral values by moral relativism and God by the Government.
In Turkey, indeed, there is no oversecularization, because the religious forces are still very strong.
Diversity: yes, there is diversity, but the more I read about it, the more I read Turkish scholars on this issue, gives me the impression that the author of this column, who is of course Turk, is right, just as Orhan Pamuk.
It is also logical - Turkey has always been a bridge between East and West. But… The bridge must be careful to keep its own identity, for if it does not guard its own identity it becomes a bit of both (which is not bad necessarily) but it might also result in the bridge not knowing who he is.
What do you think?
3 David
April 24, 2007 @ 2:50 pm CESTEB I wonder what you make of Mark Steyn’s Turkey offering here:
http://www.steynonline.com/content/view/206/
Steyn wrote a book recently suggesting that Europe would fall to Islam through demographics and so he tends to over-emphasise the issue. This is not that much of a problem in the European context, where nobody is even thinking about the consequences of catastrophically low birth rates in any context, let alone the context of take overs by immigrant populations.
In Turkey I am not that convinced by the importance of the Rumelia vs Anatolia thing, though clearly the east of the country is a lot more religious and conservative than the west.
4 EB
April 24, 2007 @ 4:26 pm CESTDavid I can easily say that 90 percent people in Turkey are Muslims. Both east sides and west sides… The difference between these sides is their being religious in daily life. Although both sides are religious, West side does not demonstare it, they consider that issue as a personal case. However, East part considers the issue of religion as a uniting factor, and they do not separate religion from the daily life. For the link, there is just one Turkey. Rumelia and Anatolia are included in Turkey. There has been no pure country with only one nation. Neither has Turkey. I accept the differences of life styles and political views between East and West which is the result of the diversity.
Michael,
The identity issue is very sensitive in Turkey. First of all, all citizens are Turk officially. ( It keeps the equality on.) However, there are also citizens who have suborigins. They are just a certain part of Turkey. The identity of the Turkey is the majority who is the follower of the Kemalism which aims the secular and modern Turkey.
5 David
April 25, 2007 @ 1:42 pm CESTThanks for your comments EB
6 mvdg
April 25, 2007 @ 1:46 pm CESTLet me second David’s comment.
The problem, though, is that quite a significant part of Turkey’s population sees things differently. 1/3 is major.
7 EB
April 25, 2007 @ 2:17 pm CESTThe protest made in 14 april proves that the majority is the Kemalists. Millions of people wanted to join this protest. Lots of them could manage it. Even the dates of the exams were changed for the students who wanted to join this protest. It is the majority who is the follower of Kemalism. Furthermore, The Republic of Turkey stands for Kemalism. And the constitution proves this. Turkey will survive as long as the idea of Kemalism exists. Of course there is also a part who are not the followers of Kemalism. But they are not the majority and I do not think that they will be.
8 mvdg
April 25, 2007 @ 2:23 pm CEST